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Contributions in the political economy of political violence.

机译：政治暴力在政治经济中的贡献。

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摘要

The dissertation consists of three chapters that analyze implications of strategic interactions between various economic and political agents in peacekeeping and transnational terrorism from a theoretical and empirical perspective. The first essay studies the impact of state fragility on the incidence and production of transnational terrorism. Using a panel data of 123 countries for 19 years, the study finds that state failure has a conditional relationship with transnational terrorism with respect to the terrorists' proximity to the target and the logistical complexity of the attacks. The second essay analyzes the dynamic implications of making concessions and paying ransoms to terrorist kidnappers. Using a unique dataset on kidnappings that records many variables such as terrorist negotiation success and amount of ransom paid, the study finds that past concessions result in more hostages being abducted owing to terrorists' anticipated future payoffs. Based on the results, not only do these concessions put a country's citizen in greater peril of becoming hostages in the future, but, for ransom payments, they fund terrorist operations, thereby placing all targeted countries at risk. The third essay studies the determinants of donor countries' personnel contributions to UN and non-UN peacekeeping operations (PKOs) based on a public good approach that allows for jointly produced donor-specific gains and pure public benefits. For UN PKOs, contributions are driven by donor specific benefits largely due to the cost-sharing mechanism in place. Since rich industrial countries bear the major share of the costs involved for UN missions, some countries with inexpensive personnel can actually earn money by sending their troops to peacekeeping deployments. On the other hand, non-UN peacekeeping displays a clear complementarity between a contributing country's own peacekeepers and those from other countries.
机译：论文共分三章，从理论和实证角度分析了维和和跨国恐怖主义中各种经济和政治因素之间战略互动的意义。第一篇文章研究了国家脆弱性对跨国恐怖主义的发生和产生的影响。使用19年中123个国家的面板数据，该研究发现，就恐怖分子与目标的接近程度和袭击的后勤复杂性而言，国家失败与跨国恐怖主义有条件关系。第二篇文章分析了让步和向绑架者支付赎金的动态含义。该研究使用一个独特的绑架数据集来记录许多变量，例如恐怖主义谈判的成功和赎金的支付，该研究发现，过去的让步导致了更多人质被绑架，这是由于恐怖分子的预期未来收益。根据结果​​，这些让步不仅会使一个国家的公民将来成为人质的更大危险，而且要支付赎金，他们将资助恐怖行动，从而使所有目标国家处于危险之中。第三篇文章基于公共利益方法研究捐助国对联合国和非联合国维持和平行动人员捐款的决定因素，该方法允许联合产生特定于捐助者的收益和纯公共利益。对于联合国维和行动部而言，捐款是由捐助者的特定利益驱动的，这在很大程度上是由于建立了费用分担机制。由于富裕的工业国承担了联合国特派团所涉及的大部分费用，因此，一些人员廉价的国家实际上可以通过派遣部队前往维和部署来赚钱。另一方面，非联合国维持和平行动在派遣国自己的维持和平人员与其他国家的维持和平人员之间具有明显的互补性。

著录项

  • 作者

    Kappiaruparampil, Justin George.;

  • 作者单位

    The University of Texas at Dallas.;

  • 授予单位 The University of Texas at Dallas.;
  • 学科 Economics.;Political science.
  • 学位 Ph.D.
  • 年度 2016
  • 页码 146 p.
  • 总页数 146
  • 原文格式 PDF
  • 正文语种 eng
  • 中图分类 康复医学;
  • 关键词

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