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首页> 外文学位 >Conscience and Attestation: The Methodological Role of the 'Call of Conscience' (Gewissensruf) in Heidegger's 'Being and Time'
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Conscience and Attestation: The Methodological Role of the 'Call of Conscience' (Gewissensruf) in Heidegger's 'Being and Time'

机译：良心与证明：海德格尔《存在与时间》中“良知的呼唤”（Gewissensruf）的方法论作用

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摘要

This study aims to exhibit the methodological role that Martin Heidegger assigns to conscience (Gewissen) in Being and Time and to reveal the implications of his interpretation of the "call of conscience" as the means of producing the attestation (Bezeugung) of authentic existence as a possibility of Being-in-the-world (or Dasein). We begin by seeking to understand how Heidegger's notion of conscience evolved prior to the 1927 publication of Being and Time and to identify the sources which contributed to his interpretation of conscience as the "call of care." Our historical analysis notably reveals that Heidegger never once describes conscience as a "call" before reading Das Gewissen (1925) by Hendrik G. Stoker, a young South African philosopher who studied under Max Scheler's direction at the University of Cologne. We specifically examine how Stoker's phenomenological study---which describes conscience as the "call-of-duty" issued to each human being by the divine "spark" (synteresis ) placed in his or her soul by God--- contributed to shaping Heidegger's account of the "existential call." Focusing on the methodological role of conscience in Being and Time, we analyze Heidegger's major work in light of his early lectures on phenomenology at Freiburg and Marburg. This approach confirms the relation between conscience in Being and Time and the concept of "formal indication" that Heidegger placed at the heart of his evolving "method" of phenomenological investigation. While many commentators have argued that Heidegger's "call of conscience" is solipsistic and impossible to experience, we propose a way of reconsidering this apparent impasse by examining what Being and Time itself "formally indicates" with regard to conscience. We show that Heidegger's conscience points to a phenomenon of existential "testimony" which is radically different from the traditional notion of conscientia. Guided by Heidegger's "formal indication" of conscience, we "destructively" review the history of the German word Gewissen and reveal its original meaning to be "testimonium" not "conscientia." In recognizing that Gewissen originally meant "attestation," we show how Heidegger's existential phenomenon of conscience can be understood as Dasein's experience of hearing the "silent testimony" of the martyr.;Keywords: Philosophy, Heidegger, Conscience, Gewissen , Existence, Phenomenology, Attestation, Bezeugung, Testimony, Martyr.
机译：这项研究旨在展示马丁·海德格尔（Martin Heidegger）赋予《存在与时间》中良心（Gewissen）的方法论作用，并揭示他对“良心的呼唤”的解释作为产生真实存在证明（Bezeugung）的手段的含义。存在于世界中的可能性（或Dasein）。我们首先试图了解海德格尔的良心观念在1927年《存在与时间》出版之前是如何演变的，并找出有助于他将良心解释为“关怀”的资源。我们的历史分析尤其表明，海德格尔从未读过年轻的南非哲学家亨德里克·斯托克（Hendrik G. Stoker）于1925年出版的《达斯·格威森》（Das Gewissen）（他曾在Max Scheler的指导下在科隆大学学习），从未将良心描述为“呼唤”。我们专门研究斯托克的现象学研究-将良心描述为上帝将“灵魂”（神志）放置在他或她的灵魂中，向每个人发出的“使命召唤”-对塑形的贡献海德格尔对“存在呼叫”的描述。着眼于良心在“存在与时间”中的方法论作用，我们根据海德格尔在弗莱堡和马尔堡的现象学早期演讲来分析他的主要工作。这种方法证实了“存在与时间”中的良心与海德格尔将其置于现象学研究“方法”的核心地位的“形式指示”概念之间的关系。尽管许多评论家认为海德格尔的“良心召唤”是单一的，无法体验，但我们提出了一种方法，通过研究“存在与时间”本身“正式表明”了良心，重新考虑这种明显的僵局。我们表明，海德格尔的良心指向存在主义的“证词”现象，这种现象与传统的良心观完全不同。在海德格尔的“良心的形式上的指示”的指导下，我们“破坏性地”回顾了德语单词格维森的历史，并揭示了其原义是“证词”而不是“良心”。在认识到盖维森最初的意思是“证明”时，我们展示了如何将海德格尔的良知的存在现象理解为该在听到烈士的“沉默证词”的经验。证明书，Bezeugung，证词，烈士。

著录项

  • 作者

    Kasowski, Gregor Bartolomeus.;

  • 作者单位

    Universite de Montreal (Canada).;

  • 授予单位 Universite de Montreal (Canada).;
  • 学科 Philosophy.
  • 学位 Ph.D.
  • 年度 2012
  • 页码 396 p.
  • 总页数 396
  • 原文格式 PDF
  • 正文语种 eng
  • 中图分类 肿瘤学;
  • 关键词

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