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Constraining the executive: How democracy improves the quality of government.

机译：限制行政人员：民主如何提高政府质量。

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摘要

Scholars and policymakers generally regard democracy as a force for better governance; however, democracy is a many-splendored thing and it is not clear which elements of a democratic regime are critical in the governance equation. Moreover, we have only an imprecise understanding of the causal mechanisms in the democracy-governance relationship. Accordingly, the goals of this dissertation are to identify those elements of democracy that have a positive impact on the quality of government and to understand the causal mechanisms underlying this relationship. I turn from the question "Does democracy improve the quality of government?" to "How does democracy improve the quality of government?";Of all the various ways in which democracy might improve the quality of government (e.g., political participation, electoral competition, press freedom and political constraints created by checks and balances), I argue that political constraints on the executive's discretionary authority, activated by checks and balances, have the greatest impact on the quality of governance. Legislative constraints, particularly, have a strong effect on the quality of government by reducing the discretionary authority of the executive over the public bureaucracy.;The dissertation follows a mixed-method research strategy. In the first section, I begin with a theoretical chapter to develop the main argument and conduct cross-national statistical analyses to identify the component of democracy underlying variations in the quality of government, using time-series data and disaggregating democracy into specific components. The second part of the dissertation comprises three case studies: Mexico, Chile, and Argentina. Here, I process-trace the decisions these new democracies took to create professional and non-corrupt bureaucracies.
机译：学者和决策者通常将民主视为改善治理的力量。然而，民主是一个光辉灿烂的事物，尚不清楚民主制度中的哪些要素在治理方程式中至关重要。此外，我们对民主与治理关系中的因果机制了解不多。因此，本论文的目标是确定对政府质量产生积极影响的民主要素，并了解这种关系背后的因果机制。我从“民主会改善政府质量吗？”这个问题转向。我论证为“民主如何改善政府质量？”；我认为在民主可以改善政府质量的各种方式中（例如政治参与，选举竞争，新闻自由和制衡制造成的政治约束）制衡制对行政自由裁量权的政治约束，对治理质量的影响最大。特别是立法约束，通过减少行政机关对公共官僚机构的自由裁量权，对政府的质量产生了很大影响。在第一部分中，我从理论章节开始，以发展主要论点并进行跨国统计分析，以使用时间序列数据并将民主分解成特定的组成部分，从而识别出政府质量变化背后的民主组成部分。论文的第二部分包括三个案例研究：墨西哥，智利和阿根廷。在这里，我将跟踪这些新民主国家为创建专业且廉洁的官僚机构而做出的决策。

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  • 作者

    Cejudo Ramirez, Guillermo Miguel.;

  • 作者单位

    Boston University.;

  • 授予单位 Boston University.;
  • 学科 Political Science General.
  • 学位 Ph.D.
  • 年度 2011
  • 页码 228 p.
  • 总页数 228
  • 原文格式 PDF
  • 正文语种 eng
  • 中图分类
  • 关键词

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