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Modeling the determinants of industry political power: Industry winners in the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981.

机译：模拟行业政治权力的决定因素：1981年《经济复苏税法》中的行业赢家。

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This study uses qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) to examine the basis of industry political power by assessing conditions of economic interdependence and political action associated with the passage of the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 (ERTA), and the significant reduction in effective tax rates for eight of eighteen U.S. industries. Past research has focused on the simple passage of "pro-business" legislation, failing to provide adequate evidence as to who benefits or how they benefit from the legislation. The Boolean analysis used in this study indicates that a distinct combination of both political action and economic factors present a clear pattern of causal conditions associated with both tax winners and losers. Using three separate analyses, the theoretically exclusive explanations offered by both class dominance and structural theories fail to provide any clear explanations. Tax policy is associated with a set of conditions that are conjunctural in nature, supporting a combined model. Strong PAC contributions, number of registered lobbyists, and outside lobby firms in association with a strong federal relationship, and either total economic strength or strong inter-industry relations produced the specific conjunctural patterns associated with "winning" industries. Lack of significant PAC contributions to the House Ways and Means and Senate Finance Committees insured an industries failure to benefit from the legislative change. The results from this study indicate that a new theoretical model is needed that incorporates the complexity of the interdependent-relationships of political and economic conditions. Evolving from the mutually exclusive theoretical explanations of the past, class segmentation, political dominance, and structural economic explanations are brought back together in a manner that exposes the complexity of the relationships resulted in tangible benefits from the passage of ERTA.
机译：本研究使用定性比较分析（QCA），通过评估与1981年《经济复苏税法》（ERTA）的通过相关的经济相互依存和政治行动的条件以及有效税率的大幅度降低，来检验行业政治权力的基础适用于美国18个行业中的8个。过去的研究集中在“亲商业”立法的简单通过上，未能提供有关谁从立法中受益或如何受益的充分证据。这项研究中使用的布尔分析表明，政治行为和经济因素的独特结合呈现出与税收优胜者和失败者相关的因果条件的清晰模式。使用三个单独的分析，阶级优势和结构理论所提供的理论上的排他性解释都无法提供任何清晰的解释。税收政策与一系列条件具有关联性，这些条件支持组合模型。强大的PAC贡献，注册的游说者数量以及与牢固的联邦关系相关的外部游说公司，以及总的经济实力或强大的行业间关系，都产生了与“制胜”行业相关的特定结局模式。 PAC对众议院筹款委员会和参议院财政委员会的投入不足，导致行业无法从立法改革中受益。这项研究的结果表明，需要一种新的理论模型，其中应包括政治和经济条件相互依存关系的复杂性。从过去的相互排斥的理论解释演变而来，阶级分割，政治支配地位和结构性经济解释以一种揭示关系复杂性的方式重新组合在一起，从而从ERTA的通过中获得了切实的利益。

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