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首页> 外文学位 >Governing governors: Coalitions and sequences of decentralization in Argentina, Colombia, and Mexico.
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Governing governors: Coalitions and sequences of decentralization in Argentina, Colombia, and Mexico.

机译：领导层：阿根廷，哥伦比亚和墨西哥的分权联盟和分权顺序。

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摘要

This dissertation brings to light the puzzle of decentralization reforms that do not transfer power to governors and mayors. Although it is generally assumed that decentralization increases the power of subnational officials, I show that if we unpack this concept into its fiscal, administrative, and political components, two of these types of reforms (administrative and fiscal) can have a negative impact on the autonomy of governors and mayors from the president. To explain these findings, I propose a sequential theory of decentralization that has three central features. First, it introduces the preferences of presidents, governors, and mayors for different types and levels of decentralization. Second, it distinguishes between the partisan and territorial interests of the political actors who push for decentralization reforms and identifies six types of decentralization coalitions (national-level, subnational, ruling, opposition, and two types of mixed coalitions) based on those interests. Third, it rejects the limitations of static theories of decentralization in favor of a dynamic account of institutional evolution that incorporates the effects of policy feedback on preference formation and power reproduction.; The main argument of the dissertation is that the sequence and timing of fiscal, administrative, and political decentralization, and the type of political coalition that initiates each round of reforms, are key determinants of the resulting evolution of intergovernmental balance of power. I measure intergovernmental balance of power using a combination of quantitative and qualitative data that include the share of expenditures of subnational governments, policy-making authority, political appointment authority, and territorial representation of interests in the national legislatures.; I test the argument by comparing the ways in which decentralization policies originated and unfolded in Argentina, Mexico, and Colombia between 1978 and 1999. I combine institutional and bargaining analysis to show that decentralization trajectories that include early political reforms and that are pushed from below by subnational actors lead to the strengthening of governors and mayors, as happened in Colombia and Mexico. In contrast, when decentralization begins with an administrative reform and is imposed from above by the national executive, it does not transfer power downwards, as I argue occurred in Argentina.
机译：这篇论文揭示了权力下放改革的难题，这种权力下放不会将权力转移给州长和市长。尽管通常认为权力下放会增强地方官员的权力，但我表明，如果将这一概念分解为财政，行政和政治组成部分，则其中两种改革（行政和财政改革）可能会对地方政府产生负面影响。州长和州长的自治权。为了解释这些发现，我提出了一种具有三个主要特征的顺序分权理论。首先，它介绍了总统，州长和市长对不同类型和不同级别的权力下放的偏好。其次，它区分了推动权力下放改革的政治参与者的党派利益和领土利益，并根据这些利益确定了六种类型的权力下放联盟（国家级，地方以下，统治，反对派和两种混合型联盟）。第三，它拒绝了静态分权理论的局限性，而是倾向于动态地解释制度变迁，这种变迁考虑了政策反馈对偏好形成和权力再生产的影响。论文的主要论点是，财政，行政和政治权力下放的顺序和时机，以及发起每轮改革的政治联盟的类型，都是决定政府间权力平衡演变的关键因素。我使用定量和定性数据的组合来衡量政府间的力量平衡，这些数据包括地方政府的支出份额，决策权，政治任命权以及国家立法机关的领土代表。我通过比较1978年至1999年在阿根廷，墨西哥和哥伦比亚实行和实行分权政策的方式来检验该论点。我结合制度分析和讨价还价分析得出的结论是，分权的轨迹包括早期的政治改革，并且被下放。地方行为者导致了州长和市长的加强，就像哥伦比亚和墨西哥那样。相反，当权力下放始于行政改革并由国家行政部门从上而下时，权力就不会向下转移，就像我在阿根廷所说的那样。

著录项

  • 作者

    Falleti, Tulia Gabriela.;

  • 作者单位

    Northwestern University.;

  • 授予单位 Northwestern University.;
  • 学科 Political Science General.; Political Science International Law and Relations.; Political Science Public Administration.
  • 学位 Ph.D.
  • 年度 2003
  • 页码 359 p.
  • 总页数 359
  • 原文格式 PDF
  • 正文语种 eng
  • 中图分类 政治理论;国际法;政治理论;
  • 关键词

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