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Earnings management and tunneling through related party transactions: Evidence from Chinese corporate groups.

机译：盈余管理和通过关联方交易建立隧道：来自中国企业集团的证据。

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摘要

From the U.S. accounting scandals to the emerging markets crisis of 1997--1998, there have been numerous examples of managers or large shareholders using related party transactions to manipulate earnings or divert resources away from their companies. This paper attempts to provide large sample evidence of these transactions in China where the corporate structure, economic institutions and weak legal system are conducive to the related party dealings. Using a sample of 131 Chinese listed firms in the basic materials industries such as mining, lumber, chemicals and building materials, we have found that firms that are controlled by a corporate group engage in more related party transactions than firms that are not. Among the group-controlled listed firms, the results show that they report abnormally high levels of related party sales, mainly to their controlling shareholders and other member firms in the group, when they have incentives to inflate earnings to avoid being delisted or prior to issuing new equity. Once the group-controlled listed firms have generated more free cash flows, they divert resources back to the group through providing other member firms generous trade credits. Our stock return results also confirm the conjectures that at least part of the related party transactions is perceived by the market as opportunistic. Investors view the reported sales figures to be less credible when they are generated from related party dealings than through arm's length transactions. Related party lending is negatively correlated with firm value, as measured by Tobin's Q and market-to-book equity.
机译：从美国的会计丑闻到1997--1998年的新兴市场危机，无数管理人员或大股东利用关联交易操纵收益或将资源从公司中挪用的例子。本文试图提供大量样本证据证明在中国的这些交易，而公司结构，经济制度和薄弱的法律制度有利于关联交易。通过对基础材料行业（例如采矿，木材，化工和建材）中131家中国上市公司的抽样调查，我们发现，与非非企业集团相比，由企业集团控制的企业进行的关联交易更多。结果显示，在集团控制的上市公司中，当他们有动机增加收益以避免被退市或在发行之前，向主要控股股东和集团中的其他成员公司报告异常高的关联方销售额（主要是向控股股东和集团中的其他成员公司）新股本。一旦由集团控制的上市公司产生了更多的自由现金流，它们就会通过向其他成员公司提供慷慨的贸易信贷，将资源转移回集团。我们的股票回报结果也证实了这样的猜想，即至少部分关联交易被市场视为机会主义的。投资者认为，从关联交易中获得的报告销售数据的可信度要比通过公平交易获得的可信度低。关联方贷款与公司价值呈负相关，如托宾的Q值和市净率所测。

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  • 作者

    Jian, Ming.;

  • 作者单位

    Hong Kong University of Science and Technology (People's Republic of China).;

  • 授予单位 Hong Kong University of Science and Technology (People's Republic of China).;
  • 学科 Business Administration Accounting.; Economics Finance.
  • 学位 Ph.D.
  • 年度 2003
  • 页码 94 p.
  • 总页数 94
  • 原文格式 PDF
  • 正文语种 eng
  • 中图分类 财务管理、经济核算;财政、金融;
  • 关键词

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