• 主题
高级搜索  >
历史搜索 清空历史
首页> 外文学位 >From Words to Deeds: Explaining China's (Non)compliance with the Global Intellectual Property Rights Regime since the Country's WTO Entry.
【24h】

From Words to Deeds: Explaining China's (Non)compliance with the Global Intellectual Property Rights Regime since the Country's WTO Entry.

机译：从言语到行动：解释中国自加入世贸组织以来对全球知识产权制度的（非）遵守情况。

获取原文
获取原文并翻译 | 示例
页面导航
  • 摘要
  • 著录项
  • 相似文献
  • 相关主题

摘要

What explains the persistent gap between China's de jure and de facto compliance with the intellectual property rights (IPR) norms, despite China's consistent legislative and enforcement efforts since the country's WTO accession in 2001? I argue that the degree of China's (non)compliance with IPR norms should be understood as a result of balancing two factors: the need for short-term economic gains by violating others' IPR, and the aspiration for long-term sustained growth by respecting IPR norms. Based on 17 months of field work in China from 2007 to 2008, I argue that Chinese IPR policy has emerged within the context of the legacy of planned economy and an immature market mechanism. In this environment, only a small handful of elite Chinese domestic private-sector companies are actively engaged in innovative activities---most firms continue to rely on the input of natural resources and cheap labor to survive market competition. Although foreign business investors in China hold IPR as a vital component of their competitiveness, their business activities are interpreted as exploiting Chinese wealth by economic nationalists in the Chinese mass public. As such, under some circumstances the advocates of IPR norms---those few cutting-edge Chinese companies along with foreign IPR holders---are strong enough to persuade Chinese government officials to comply with the IPR norms and achieve the country's long-term economic development goals. However, under many other circumstances, Chinese local governments will protect IPR infringers and ignore IPR norms---even though they possess the enforcement capacity---because of the short term political interest in raising tax revenue and creating jobs.
机译：尽管自2001年加入世界贸易组织以来中国一直在立法和执法方面做出了不懈的努力，如何解释中国在法律上与事实上在遵守知识产权（IPR）规范之间仍然存在的差距？我认为，中国（不）遵守知识产权规范的程度应被理解为平衡两个因素的结果：通过侵犯他人的知识产权获得短期经济利益的需要，以及通过尊重实现长期持续增长的愿望知识产权规范。基于2007年至2008年在中国进行的17个月的实地考察，我认为中国的知识产权政策是在计划经济的遗留和不成熟的市场机制的背景下出现的。在这种环境下，只有极少数的中国国内精英私营公司积极参与创新活动-大多数公司继续依靠自然资源和廉价劳动力的投入来生存市场竞争。尽管在中国的外国商业投资者将知识产权作为其竞争力的重要组成部分，但经济民族主义者在中国公众中将其商业活动解释为利用中国的财富。因此，在某些情况下，知识产权规范的倡导者-很少有尖端的中国公司以及外国知识产权持有人-足以说服中国政府官员遵守知识产权规范并实现该国的长期发展经济发展目标。但是，在许多其他情况下，由于地方政府在增加税收和创造就业机会方面具有短期政治利益，因此，即使他们拥有执法能力，中国地方政府也将保护知识产权侵权者，而无视知识产权规范。

著录项

  • 作者

    Zhang, Zhenqing.;

  • 作者单位

    University of Minnesota.;

  • 授予单位 University of Minnesota.;
  • 学科 Intellectual Property.;Political Science International Law and Relations.
  • 学位 Ph.D.
  • 年度 2011
  • 页码 260 p.
  • 总页数 260
  • 原文格式 PDF
  • 正文语种 eng
  • 中图分类
  • 关键词

相似文献

  • 外文文献
  • 中文文献
  • 专利
获取原文

客服邮箱：kefu@zhangqiaokeyan.com

京公网安备：11010802029741号 ICP备案号：京ICP备15016152号-6 六维联合信息科技 (北京) 有限公司©版权所有

  • 客服微信

  • 服务号