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首页> 外文学位 >The impact of outside directors and the board on the financial performance of large federally-chartered savings and loans banks in the United States of America.
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The impact of outside directors and the board on the financial performance of large federally-chartered savings and loans banks in the United States of America.

机译：外部董事和董事会对美利坚合众国大型联邦储蓄和贷款银行的财务绩效的影响。

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摘要

The conflict of interest between principal and agent especially owners and managers has been the focus of an economic theory of agency. Agency theorists have identified control mechanisms to produce an alignment of interests. This dissertation explores the impact of outside directors and the board on the financial performance of large banks with a savings and loans license in the United States of America. Previous empirical studies have provided mixed support for expectations of agency theorists regarding the internal control mechanism of outside directors on the firm.; After establishing that the majority of the outside directors of U.S. banks are current CEOs of other firms this thesis uses multiple regressions to examine research propositions that could confirm expectations of agency theorists concerning specific remedies to the agency problem.; The regression results in this study show that contrary to expectations of agency theorists the impact of outside directors and the board on the financial performance of the large banking firm is inconclusive. Other theories may help explain these results. The Executive Inner Circle Theory, for example, asserts that CEOs of large firms in general, link through boards, look after their compensation and benefits, satisfy minimum demands of stakeholders and ensure some general benefits to society. Maximizing shareholder value is of lower priority. Agency theory applies to the principal agent relationship but the expectations of agency theorists are not realized because there may be other relationships that exist.; Examining banks in particular, this dissertation argues that mixed results on past empirical studies on the agency relationship may be due to other relationships such as a relationship between the CEO and outside directors. This suggestion takes us away from the purely economic perspective of agency theory and opens a way for socio-economic and political analysis. Future research can build on this study to isolate the effects of the CEO on firm financial performance.
机译：委托人和代理人，尤其是所有者和管理者之间的利益冲突一直是代理人经济学理论的重点。代理理论家已经确定了控制机制，以产生利益一致性。本文探讨了外部董事和董事会对在美国拥有储蓄和贷款许可证的大型银行的财务业绩的影响。以前的经验研究为代理理论家对公司外部董事内部控制机制的期望提供了混合支持。在确定美国银行的大多数外部董事是其他公司的现任首席执行官之后，本论文使用多元回归来检验研究命题，这些命题可以确认代理理论家对代理问题的具体补救措施的期望。该研究的回归结果表明，与代理理论家的预期相反，外部董事和董事会对大型银行公司财务业绩的影响尚无定论。其他理论可能有助于解释这些结果。例如，执行者内部循环理论认为，大公司的首席执行官通常通过董事会联系起来，照顾他们的薪酬和利益，满足利益相关者的最低要求，并确保一些对社会的总体利益。最大化股东价值是次要的。代理理论适用于委托人代理关系，但由于可能存在其他关系，代理理论家的期望并未实现。特别是从银行角度出发，本文认为，过去关于代理关系的实证研究结果参差不齐，可能是由于其他关系，例如首席执行官与外部董事之间的关系。该建议使我们脱离了代理理论的纯粹经济学观点，并为社会经济和政治分析开辟了道路。可以在此研究的基础上进行进一步的研究，以隔离首席执行官对公司财务绩效的影响。

著录项

  • 作者

    Alagaratnam, Stephen Thevanesar.;

  • 作者单位

    York University (Canada).;

  • 授予单位 York University (Canada).;
  • 学科 Business Administration Management.
  • 学位 Ph.D.
  • 年度 2003
  • 页码 216 p.
  • 总页数 216
  • 原文格式 PDF
  • 正文语种 eng
  • 中图分类 贸易经济;
  • 关键词

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