This dissertation studies how capital market imperfections affect firm behavior. The first essay, joint with Aditya V. Sunderam, studies how credit ratings and regulations tied to ratings segment capital markets and how the resulting segmentation affects firm investment. Because regulations prevent many investors from holding speculative-grade securities, shocks to capital of investors specializing in these securities, might not be immediately offset and can therefore affect the cost of capital for speculative-grade firms. Focusing on a matched sample of firms just above and just below the investment-grade cutoff, we show that flows into speculative-grade mutual funds have an economically significant effect on the investment of speculative-grade firms, especially those with limited alternative financing options.;The second essay, also joint with Aditya V. Sunderam, studies how the supply of arbitrage capital, specifically capital available to convertible arbitrage hedge funds, affects firm investment. An extra ;The third essay, joint with C. Fritz Foley and Robin Greenwood, studies the interaction between stock market mispricing, agency costs, and ownership structure. Standard theories of corporate ownership assume that because markets are efficient, insiders ultimately bear agency costs. We show that if equity is overvalued, however, mispricing offsets agency costs and can induce a controlling shareholder to list equity. Higher valuations support listings with greater agency costs. We test these ideas on a sample of publicly listed subsidiaries in Japan. We show that when there is greater scope for expropriation by the parent firm, minority shareholders fare poorly after listing. Parent firms often repurchase subsidiaries at large discounts to valuations at the time of listing and experience positive announcement returns.
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机译：本文研究了资本市场的缺陷如何影响企业行为。与Aditya V. Sunderam联合撰写的第一篇文章研究了信用评级和法规与评级细分资本市场的关系，以及由此产生的细分如何影响公司投资。因为法规阻止许多投资者持有投机级证券，所以专门从事这些证券的投资者对资本的冲击可能不会立即得到抵消，因此可能会影响投机级公司的资本成本。着眼于恰好在投资级别截止点之上和之下的公司的匹配样本，我们表明流入投机级别共同基金对投机级别公司的投资具有经济上显着的影响，特别是那些替代融资选择有限的公司。第二篇论文，也与Aditya V. Sunderam合作，研究了套利资本的供应，特别是可转换套利对冲基金的可用资本，如何影响公司投资。第三篇论文，与C. Fritz Foley和Robin Greenwood共同研究了股票市场定价错误，代理成本和所有权结构之间的相互作用。公司所有权的标准理论假设，由于市场高效，内部人最终将承担代理成本。我们证明，如果股票被高估，定价错误会抵消代理成本，并可能导致控股股东上市。较高的估值会通过较高的代理费用来支持上市。我们在日本的公开上市子公司样本中测试了这些想法。我们表明，当母公司有更大的征用范围时，少数股东在上市后的表现不佳。母公司经常以低于上市时估值的折扣价回购子公司，并获得积极的公告收益。
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