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Essays on public finance and economic development in a historical institutional perspective: China, 1840--1911.

机译:历史制度视角下的公共财政与经济发展论文集:中国,1840--1911年。

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摘要

While internal political order, regional dominance, and economic prosperity prevailed in early 19th-century China, in the decades after 1840, China experienced a series of external political crises, unprecedented internal rebellions, and economic stagnation. In particular, fiscal stability and adequacy in the early period had given way to modest revenue growth that fell short of surging government expenditure needs. In this dissertation, I adopt a game-theoretical approach to interpret such contrasting political and economic outcomes as manifestations of an underlying political and economic equilibrium. Namely, taxation by bureaucracy functioned as a rent-seeking device through which the Qing both pre-empted political opposition and mobilized fiscal resources. At the same time, cultural beliefs coordinating rural taxpayers enforced property rights against excessive, arbitrary extralegal taxation and sustained economic growth for the long run. The centrality of such beliefs implied institutionalized inflexibilities. Using comparative statics analysis, I explain fiscal development in the late Qing period---stagnant land tax revenue, rise of commercial taxation, and its limited revenue-generating capacity---as equilibrium responses to exogenous fiscal shocks. I apply the insights from the model to the puzzling pattern of guild growth in the late Qing. By embedding guild development in the context of profound fiscal changes of the period---the rising importance of revenue from commerce and the Qing's increasing difficulty in administering viable commercial taxation---I interpret the accelerated growth of late Qing guilds and their expanding sphere of influence as outcomes of a self-reinforcing equilibrium. On the one hand, tax farming enabled guilds to protect members' property rights and sustained likin revenue for the long run; on the other hand, the success of tax farming reinforced guilds' internal cohesion and enhanced guild power. Finally, I explore the implications of late Qing's fiscal stagnation for China's economic development. I substantiate the claim that the lack of fiscal resources greatly hindered China's industrialization in this period. By failing to ensure macroeconomic stability and aggressively promote infrastructure development, capital formation, and technology transfer, the Qing provided little badly needed impetus for the Chinese economy to overcome capital market imperfections and engage in industrial growth.
机译:尽管内部政治秩序,区域优势和经济繁荣在19世纪初期的中国盛行,但在1840年之后的几十年中,中国经历了一系列外部政治危机,前所未有的内部叛乱和经济停滞。尤其是,早期的财政稳定和充足性已经让位于适度的收入增长,而政府的需求却没有增加。在这篇论文中,我采用博弈论的方法来解释这种相反的政治和经济结果,作为潜在的政治和经济平衡的体现。就是说,官僚主义的征税起到了寻租的作用,清政府通过它既抢占了政治反对派,又动员了财政资源。同时,从长远来看,协调农村纳税人的文化信仰使财产权免受过度的,任意的法外税收和持续的经济增长的影响。这种信念的中心性意味着制度化的灵活性。通过比较静态分析,我解释了晚清时期的财政发展-停滞的土地税收入,商业税的增加及其有限的创收能力-作为对外部财政冲击的均衡反应。我将模型中的见解应用于清末公会增长的令人困惑的模式。通过将公会的发展纳入这一时期深刻的财政变化的背景下-商业收入的重要性日益提高,而清政府在可行的商业税收管理方面日益困难-我解释了晚清公会的加速发展及其范围的扩大影响力作为自我强化平衡的结果。一方面,税收耕种使行会从长远来看可以保护会员的财产和持续的收入。另一方面,税收耕种的成功增强了行会的内部凝聚力和行会权力。最后,我探讨了清末财政停滞对中国经济发展的影响。我证实了这一说法,即缺乏财政资源极大地阻碍了这一时期的中国工业化。由于未能确保宏观经济稳定并积极推动基础设施建设,资本形成和技术转让,清政府没有为中国经济克服急需的动力提供动力,以克服资本市场的不完善并促进工业发展。

著录项

  • 作者

    Li, Mu Yang.;

  • 作者单位

    Stanford University.;

  • 授予单位 Stanford University.;
  • 学科 History Asia Australia and Oceania.;Economics History.;Economics General.
  • 学位 Ph.D.
  • 年度 2003
  • 页码 171 p.
  • 总页数 171
  • 原文格式 PDF
  • 正文语种 eng
  • 中图分类
  • 关键词

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