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Duverger's law versus the cleavage approach: Testing competing theories of party systems in new democracies.

机译:杜弗格定律与分裂方法:在新民主国家中检验政党制度的竞争理论。

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摘要

This dissertation is a quantitative analysis of party systems in the so-called third-wave new democracies in Latin America, Southern and Eastern Europe, and Asia. It examines how institutional (electoral systems) and structural (social cleavages) factors affect the development of party systems in perspectives of the number of parliamentary parties, inter-party structures, the relative strength of parties to non-partisan independents, and the institutionalization of party systems.; The regression results demonstrate that both institutional and structural factors matter in the formation of party systems, though the former seems to be more powerful. While the impact of structural factors on party systems is largely stable, the consequences of electoral systems for party systems are much more complex than what is usually assumed. Proportional representation (PR) electoral formulas and large districts have a double-edged effect on the number of parties on the one hand, and their multiplying power is usually conditioned by other variables on the other.; A Single-member district (SMD)/the first party and PR/multipartism rather than Duverger's SMD/bipartism and PR/multipartism dichotomy is found in the analysis of inter-party structures in new democracies, showing that the main difference between SMD and PR is their bias for/against the dominant party. The analysis of non-partisan independents in new democracies suggests that mixed electoral systems and presidential systems may lead to non-partisan independents. The regression results of institutionalization of party systems indicate that the electoral rules that encourage spatial voting such as PR and large assemblies may help institutionalize party systems, while those that encourage strategic voting such as thresholds may destabilize party competition.; It is argued that careful design of electoral institutions can help strengthen parties and institutionalize party systems, and thus, smooth democratic transitions in the transforming third-world countries.
机译:本文是对拉丁美洲,南欧和东欧以及亚洲所谓的第三波新民主国家政党制度的定量分析。它从议会政党的数目,政党间的结构,政党对无党派独立人士的相对实力以及政党制度化的角度,研究了体制(选举制度)和结构(社会分裂)因素如何影响政党制度的发展。政党制度。回归结果表明,制度和结构因素都与政党制度的形成有关,尽管前者似乎更强大。虽然结构性因素对政党制度的影响在很大程度上是稳定的,但选举制度对政党制度的影响要比通常所设想的要复杂得多。比例代表制的选举方式和大选区一方面对政党人数产生双重影响,另一方面,其乘数通常受其他变量的制约。在对新民主国家党际结构的分析中发现了一个单人区(SMD)/第一党和PR /多党制,而不是Duverger的SMD /两党和PR /多党二分法,这表明SMD和PR之间的主要区别是他们对统治党的偏见。对新民主国家中无党派独立人士的分析表明,混合的选举制度和总统制可能导致无党派独立人士。政党制度制度化的回归结果表明,鼓励进行空间投票(例如PR和大型集会)的选举规则可能有助于政党制度的制度化,而那些鼓励进行战略投票(例如门槛)的制度可能会破坏政党竞争的稳定性。有人认为,精心设计选举机构可以帮助加强政党并使政党制度制度化,从而在转型中的第三世界国家实现平稳的民主过渡。

著录项

  • 作者

    Liu, Xinmin.;

  • 作者单位

    University of New Orleans.;

  • 授予单位 University of New Orleans.;
  • 学科 Political Science General.; Political Science International Law and Relations.
  • 学位 Ph.D.
  • 年度 2002
  • 页码 170 p.
  • 总页数 170
  • 原文格式 PDF
  • 正文语种 eng
  • 中图分类 政治理论;国际法;
  • 关键词

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