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Regulatory capital and earnings management in banks: The case of loan sales and securitizations.

机译:银行的监管资本和收益管理:贷款销售和证券化的情况。

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In this dissertation, I examine whether banks use loan securitizations in managing accounting information for regulatory purposes and whether bank managers' private information is detectable in gains from securitizations. Recent changes in the accounting for loan transfers have allowed securitizations with certain forms of retained interests to be accounted for as sales. Securitizations that are accounted for as sales affect shareholder's equity by allowing capitalization of expected future income. My analysis suggests that banks use gains from securitizations to affect both regulatory capital and earnings after controlling for other motivations to securitize loans. The gains can be attributed both to loan selection and to overvaluation of retained interests. I also find that unexpected gains from securitization contain negative news. Quarterly net income declines following unexpected gains, and unexpected gains by higher-capitalized banks are more negatively associated with excess returns than those by lower-capitalized banks.
机译:在本文中,我研究了银行是否出于监管目的使用贷款证券化管理会计信息,以及是否可以从证券化收益中检测出银行经理的私人信息。贷款转移会计的最新变化允许将具有某些形式的保留权益的证券化作为销售入账。记为销售的证券化通过允许将预期未来收益资本化而影响股东权益。我的分析表明,银行在控制其他证券化动机之后,会利用证券化的收益来影响监管资本和收益。收益既可以归因于贷款选择,也归因于保留权益的高估。我还发现,证券化带来的意想不到的收益包含负面消息。由于意外收益,季度净收入下降,而资本较高的银行比资本较低的银行,意外收益与超额收益负相关性更高。

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