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Agency problems in public financial management: Evidence from debt refinancing practices.

机译：公共财务管理中的代理问题：来自债务再融资实践的证据。

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摘要

In recent years several state governments have reformed their financial management practices by placing greater restrictions on the sale and management of government debt including practices related to debt refinancing. The escalating use of these debt restrictions is predicated on the belief that there may be a pervasive principal-agent problem between taxpayers and public financial managers. Statutory debt restrictions are needed to ensure that a public financial manager's actions reflect the desires and policy goals of the public, which, in this case, are assumed to be the long-term cost efficient and effective management of state debt. However, there is concern that these debt restrictions may not be costless. That is, they may lead to more prudent management of government debt in certain circumstances but, at other times, debt restrictions, including limits on bond refinancing, may unduly restrict public financial managers and lead to a less efficacious debt management program thus undermining the principal's goals.;Utilizing descriptive research, this study begins by generally examining the debt refinancing practices and trends of state governments over the last few decades as a means of providing general context to the main research area at hand. Next, the study applies event analysis from the State of Illinois to investigate the efficacy of statutory restrictions related to bond refinancing practices. Given the potential costs of these debt refinancing restrictions, this study then proceeds to empirically investigate two common decisions in this area of debt management, the refinancing savings structure decision and the decision on bond interest rate mode, to determine whether there is evidence of a pervasive principal-agent problem that would warrant the use of restrictive public managerial control mechanisms. Through the event analysis, this study demonstrates that debt restrictions can lead to unintended consequences whereby the state actually engages in less effective and efficient debt management practices. However, the descriptive research analyzing the two refinancing decisions provides evidence that an agency problem is not widespread in the management of state debt and through linear regression and logit analysis identifies the factors that exacerbate or mitigate these potential agency problems to the extent they are present.
机译：近年来，一些州政府通过对政府债券的销售和管理施加更大的限制，包括与债务再融资有关的做法，对财务管理方式进行了改革。这些债务限制的逐步使用是基于以下信念，即纳税人和公共财务经理之间可能存在普遍的委托代理问题。需要通过法定债务限制来确保公共财务经理的行为反映出公众的愿望和政策目标，在这种情况下，这些目标和政策目标被认为是长期成本有效且有效地管理国家债务。然而，令人担忧的是，这些债务限制可能并非没有成本。也就是说，在某些情况下，它们可能导致对政府债务的更审慎的管理，但在其他时候，债务限制（包括对债券再融资的限制）可能会不适当地限制公共财务经理，并导致效率较低的债务管理计划，从而损害了本金的目标；利用描述性研究，本研究首先从总体上考察过去几十年来州政府的债务再融资实践和趋势，以此作为对当前主要研究领域提供总体背景的一种手段。接下来，该研究应用了伊利诺伊州的事件分析来调查与债券再融资实践有关的法定限制的效力。考虑到这些债务再融资限制的潜在成本，本研究将继续以实证方式研究债务管理领域的两个共同决策，即再融资储蓄结构决策和债券利率模式决策，以确定是否存在普遍存在的证据。委托代理问题，需要使用限制性的公共管理控制机制。通过事件分析，该研究表明，债务限制可能导致意想不到的后果，从而使国家实际上参与了效率较低和效率不高的债务管理实践。但是，分析这两个再融资决策的描述性研究提供了证据，表明代理问题在国债管理中并不广泛，并且通过线性回归和logit分析确定了在可能的程度上加剧或减轻这些潜在代理问题的因素。

著录项

  • 作者

    Luby, Martin J.;

  • 作者单位

    Indiana University.;

  • 授予单位 Indiana University.;
  • 学科 Economics Finance.;Political Science Public Administration.;Political Science General.
  • 学位 Ph.D.
  • 年度 2010
  • 页码 297 p.
  • 总页数 297
  • 原文格式 PDF
  • 正文语种 eng
  • 中图分类
  • 关键词

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