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Agency, incentive, and institutional design: Bureaucracy control and evolution of governance in contemporary China.

机译：代理，激励和制度设计：当代中国的官僚控制与治理演进。

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摘要

This dissertation offers an analytical perspective on control of the bureaucracy and the changes in governance structure in contemporary China. Specifically, I try to answer the following questions. First, why is bureaucratic noncompliance on the rise during the transition? How might we explain the variation of noncompliance across different issue areas? Second, how has the central leadership tried to reassert control over the bureaucracy? What kind of control mechanisms and monitoring techniques have been adopted and why? Finally, what impacts might this noncompliance issue have on the overall governance structure? In the past decade, Chinese central leaders have made tremendous efforts to improve governance. Is controlling bureaucrats one contributing factor? If so, what is the logic?; My goal in the dissertation is not to paint a complete picture of these events, but to offer a logic that can organize these issues in one succinct and coherent explanatory framework. This logic is built on an organizational perspective that focuses on bureaucrats' incentive. Throughout the dissertation, I argue that the control problem between central leaders and local bureaucrats in Chinese politics can be fruitfully explored in a principal-agent framework. Because of information asymmetry and conflict of interest, central leaders will have trouble in obtaining full compliance from local bureaucrats. But, being rational, they will adopt rules and design institutions that can mitigate these two types of problems. How these rules and institutions enhance local bureaucrats' incentive for compliance is the focus of my analysis. Under this theoretical setup, five hypotheses have been generated regarding bureaucratic noncompliance and its variation, government structure and agents' incentives, the choices of control mechanisms, and institutional redesigning.; I test these hypotheses with a case study of Chinese central leaders' effort to regulate the coal industry in the 1990s. The agency logic in this dissertation contributes to our understanding of institutional rules and governance structure changes during China' state rebuilding process. At a general level, it also shed some light on the issue of power and control.
机译：本文为当代中国官僚主义的控制和治理结构的变化提供了分析视角。具体来说，我尝试回答以下问题。首先，为什么在过渡期间官僚主义不合规现象在增加？我们如何解释不同问题领域的违规情况？第二，中央领导如何试图重新确立对官僚主义的控制？采用了哪种控制机制和监控技术，为什么？最后，这种不合规问题可能会对整体治理结构产生什么影响？在过去的十年中，中国中央领导人为改善治理做出了巨大的努力。控制官僚是一个促成因素吗？如果是这样，逻辑是什么？我在本文中的目的不是要对这些事件进行全面的描述，而是要提供一种可以在一个简洁而连贯的解释框架中组织这些问题的逻辑。这种逻辑建立在注重官僚激励的组织视角上。在整个论文中，我认为可以在委托代理框架下有效地研究中国政治中中央领导人与地方官僚之间的控制问题。由于信息不对称和利益冲突，中央领导人将难以获得当地官僚的完全遵守。但是，出于理性，他们将采用规则和设计机构来减轻这两种类型的问题。这些规则和机构如何增强地方官员对合规的动机是我分析的重点。在这种理论背景下，就官僚不合规及其变化，政府结构和代理人的激励，控制机制的选择以及制度的重新设计产生了五个假设。我通过对1990年代中国中央领导人为规范煤炭行业所做的努力进行案例研究来检验这些假设。本文的代理逻辑有助于我们了解中国国家重建过程中的制度规则和治理结构的变化。从总体上讲，它还为电源和控制问题提供了一些启示。

著录项

  • 作者

    Su, Fubing.;

  • 作者单位

    The University of Chicago.;

  • 授予单位 The University of Chicago.;
  • 学科 Political Science General.
  • 学位 Ph.D.
  • 年度 2002
  • 页码 214 p.
  • 总页数 214
  • 原文格式 PDF
  • 正文语种 eng
  • 中图分类 政治理论;
  • 关键词

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