This dissertation addresses an understudied aspect of democratic consolidation: the codification of formal rules and procedures of governance. The recent enactment of Administrative Procedure Acts (APAs) in two new democracies, Korea and Taiwan, highlights an apparent paradox embedded in the passage of all similar laws, particularly in countries with separately elected chief executives. Because administrative reform limits the executive's power, it is clear why legislatures in separation-of-power systems would favor APAs. But it is less clear why presidents would support them. Absent the threat of a veto override, why would a president sign a law designed to tie her own hands, impose extra costs of implementing rules and regulations, and cause delays in her own programs? The answer, in short, is that presidents have agency problems too. The more intra-branch conflict they face during their administrations, the more likely they will support an APA. Thus, while some scholars have argued that an APA protects the status quo by tying the hands of future administrations, I argue that presidents can also use APAs to overcome current control problems.; Previous theories of APA passage rest solely upon the American case. In an effort to expand this scholarly debate to a comparative context, I focus on three recently democratized East Asian countries, two with APAs (Korea and Taiwan) and one without (Philippines). My evidence is derived from a combination of secondary sources, archival research and interviews conducted through fieldwork in Korea, Taiwan, and the Philippines in 1999 and 2000.; The cases support my “current control” theory. Korea's first democratic president advocated an APA when he could not replace bureaucrats whose economic policy preferences conflicted with his own. In Taiwan, APA passage resulted from increased factional conflict within the cabinet, combined with conflicting preferences between the ruling party reformist ministers and bureaucrats. In the Philippines, in contrast, following re-democratization, while the president did confront a divided cabinet and a bureaucracy dominated by loyalists from the previous authoritarian regime, she was able to manage delegation by distributing patronage jobs to her own agents. Hence, she did not need the “second-best” solution of an APA.
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