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Decision analysis in construction claims

机译：施工索赔中的决策分析

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摘要

Claims in construction projects are inevitable and can result in costly litigation. Construction contract ambiguity, overly restrictive terms, and unfairly allocated risks are among the factors increasing the likelihood of conflict between parties in construction claims. The source of conflict is a gap between parties' beliefs over specifics of a claim. This research introduces a settlement negotiation model that provides methods for disagreeing parties to understand the gaps in their beliefs and possibly to come to an agreement before litigation. The quantitative decision analysis approach identifies a range for the optimal settlement amount in the claim process.;Each party holds private information regarding its belief over the specifics of a claim. The specifics of a claim are classified into Liability, the likelihood of the defendant being found liable at a trial, and Damages, unanticipated expenditures plaintiff incurred due to the defendant's alleged fault. A Bayesian Network model quantifies parties' beliefs over Liability and Damages. This model represents parties' legal arguments and their respective strengths and credibility. These beliefs become inputs to a non-cooperative game theory model. Non-cooperative game theory analyzes interactions between the claim parties at each stage of the claim. The asymmetric information game considers each party's actions and strategy based on its belief over the expected outcome from litigation, and its belief over the opponent's expected outcome from litigation. The analysis results in equilibriums that help parties decide how to resolve the claim and avoid costly and timely litigation. The resulting approach reveals predictive outcomes in construction claims using economic theory to analyze construction disputes.
机译：建设项目中的索偿是不可避免的，并可能导致昂贵的诉讼费用。施工合同含糊不清，限制条款过于严格以及风险分配不公等因素均增加了施工索赔中各方之间发生冲突的可能性。冲突的根源是当事方对索赔细节的看法之间的差距。这项研究引入了和解谈判模型，该模型为争端的各方提供了各种方法，以使他们理解自己的信念上的空白，并有可能在诉讼之前达成协议。定量决策分析方法确定了索赔过程中最佳结算金额的范围。每一方均持有有关其对索赔细节的信念的私人信息。索赔的具体内容分为责任，被告在审判中被追究责任的可能性以及损害赔偿，由于被告的过错而引起的原告意外支出。贝叶斯网络模型量化了各方对责任和损害的信念。这种模式代表了当事方的法律论据及其各自的优势和信誉。这些信念成为非合作博弈模型的输入。非合作博弈论分析了索赔各个阶段中索赔方之间的互动。非对称信息博弈基于各方对诉讼预期结果的信念以及对对手诉讼预期结果的信念来考虑各方的行动和策略。通过分析得出平衡点，可以帮助当事方决定如何解决索赔并避免昂贵且及时的诉讼。由此产生的方法利用经济理论分析了建筑纠纷，揭示了建筑索赔中的预测结果。

著录项

  • 作者

    Lessani, Arian.;

  • 作者单位

    University of Maryland, College Park.;

  • 授予单位 University of Maryland, College Park.;
  • 学科 Economics.;Alternative dispute resolution.;Artificial intelligence.
  • 学位 Ph.D.
  • 年度 2016
  • 页码 218 p.
  • 总页数 218
  • 原文格式 PDF
  • 正文语种 eng
  • 中图分类
  • 关键词

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