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首页> 外文学位 >Do unconscious mental states exist? Freud, Searle, and the conceptual foundations of cognitive science (Sigmund Freud, John R. Searle).
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Do unconscious mental states exist? Freud, Searle, and the conceptual foundations of cognitive science (Sigmund Freud, John R. Searle).

机译：是否存在潜意识状态？弗洛伊德·塞尔和认知科学的概念基础（西格蒙德·弗洛伊德，约翰·R·塞尔）。

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摘要

Do unconscious mental states exist? Cartesians answer “no,” claiming that consciousness is the essence of the mental. I consider two ways to defend unconscious mentation. Cognitivists, from Freud to contemporary cognitive scientists and semantic naturalists, claim that the common essence of the mental is intentionality in the form of brain representationality defined independently of consciousness, with consciousness merely an incidental property. Alternatively, Searle argues that unconscious contents are dispositions to cause conscious contents, leaving consciousness at the conceptual center of the mental.; I take Freud as paradigmatic of cognitivism and reconstruct and critique his argument for unconscious mental states. Because conscious content is essentially determinate, Freud's position that all mental states have the same essence implies that unconscious content is determinate. However, I defend Searle's claim that Quinian indeterminacy defeats behavioral and neurophysiological accounts of content, and extend the claim to other third-person accounts (functionalist, informational, teleosemantic) and to “mixed-system” accounts that use causal relations between non-conscious and conscious states to fix unconscious content. Thus, no available cognitivist account yields determinate unconscious content, and Freud's argument fails.; I argue that, although Searle is correct that unconscious content is defined in terms of conscious content, his Connection Principle is not an adequate basis for attributing genuine content. I thus offer an alternative account of consciousness-based unconscious content: A non-conscious brain state has content if its natural function is to represent whatever is represented by a specific conscious content (Teleological Connection Principle). The link to consciousness ensures determinacy, and the teleological component ensures genuine content. I defend the non-observer-relative status of natural-function ascriptions via a black-box-essentialist analysis that implies that natural functions are naturally selected effects.; Contrary to Searle's position, I claim that unconscious content offers a genuine “third level” of explanation between neurophysiology and conscious intentionality. However, cognitive science's postulation of “deeply unconscious” representations not functionally linked to consciousness is rejected on indeterminacy grounds. Unconscious and conscious content are essentially different, so the cognitivist claim that the study of brain representationality is the science of the mental fails. Unconscious mental states do exist, and their semantics must be consciousness based.
机译：是否存在潜意识状态？笛卡尔回答“不”，声称意识是精神的本质。我考虑了两种捍卫潜意识的方法。从弗洛伊德（Freud）到当代认知科学家和语义博物学家的认知主义者声称，心理的共同本质是意图的形式，即大脑表征的形式，其独立于意识而定义，意识只是附带属性。另外，塞尔（Searle）认为，无意识的内容是导致有意识的内容的倾向，使意识处于精神的概念中心。我将弗洛伊德视为认知主义的范式，并重构和批判了弗洛伊德关于无意识心理状态的观点。因为有意识的内容本质上是决定性的，所以弗洛伊德关于所有精神状态具有相同本质的立场暗示着无意识的内容是决定性的。但是，我捍卫了Searle的说法，即奎尼安式不确定性会破坏内容的行为和神经生理学解释，并将其扩展到其他第三人称（功能主义，信息性，远程信息性）和使用非意识之间因果关系的“混合系统”账户。和有意识的状态来修复无意识的内容。因此，没有可用的认知主义者的陈述能够确定潜意识的内容，弗洛伊德的论证失败了。我认为，尽管塞尔确实正确地定义了无意识的内容是根据有意识的内容来定义的，但他的《联系原则》仍不足以作为对真实内容进行归因的基础。因此，我提供了基于意识的无意识内容的另一种解释：如果无意识的大脑状态的自然功能是表示特定的有意识内容所代表的任何东西，则无意识的大脑状态即具有满足感（Teleological Connection Principle）。与意识的联系确保确定性，目的论部分确保真正的内容。我通过黑盒本质论分析来捍卫自然功能归因的非观察者相对状态，这暗示自然功能是自然选择的效果。与塞尔的立场相反，我声称无意识的内容在神经生理学和有意识的意图之间提供了真正的“第三级”解释。但是，由于不确定性的原因，拒绝了认知科学关于与意识没有功能联系的“深度无意识”表示的假设。无意识和有意识的内容本质上是不同的，因此，认知主义者声称对大脑表征的研究是精神失败的科学。潜意识状态确实存在，其语义必须基于意识。

著录项

  • 作者

    Wakefield, Jerome Carl.;

  • 作者单位

    University of California, Berkeley.;

  • 授予单位 University of California, Berkeley.;
  • 学科 Philosophy.; Psychology Cognitive.
  • 学位 Ph.D.
  • 年度 2001
  • 页码 1408 p.
  • 总页数 1408
  • 原文格式 PDF
  • 正文语种 eng
  • 中图分类 哲学理论;心理学;
  • 关键词

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