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An empirical examination of the capitalization of mortgage loan servicing rights: A positive approach.

机译：对抵押贷款服务权资本化的实证检验：一种积极的方法。

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摘要

This study is an examination of the financial services industry within the context of positive accounting theory specifically as it relates to the activity of mortgage loan servicing. Firms engaged in the servicing of mortgage loans are presented with an accounting choice relative to the capitalization of mortgage loan servicing rights (MSRs). Capitalization of MSRs is required by Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 125. The mechanics of capitalization are complex and SFAS No. 125 is devoid of specific rules and instructions as to how capitalization is to occur. The lack of specific guidance presents managers with an accounting choice. They can capitalize MSRs conservatively or aggressively. This study is an examination of the choice made by managers when capitalizing MSRs.; This study improves on prior positive accounting research in a number of ways. This study uses panel data acquired over a four-year period, examines an accounting choice that can be operationalized as a continuous dependent variable as opposed to operationalizing the dependent variable as a dummy variable to indicate one choice over another, measures all monetary independent variables as continuous variables, is an intra-industry study as opposed to a cross-sectional study and the only study known to examine the financial services industry. Additionally, it is thought to be the first study to examine the question of whether managers will make choices outside of the choices intended for them by the Financial Accounting Standards Board.; Five hypotheses are developed from positive accounting theory. Managers of large firms will capitalize MSRs at lower levels (income decreasing) than managers of small firms. Managers of firms with high debt-to-equity ratios will capitalize MSRs at higher levels (income increasing) than will managers of firms with lower debt-to-equity ratios. Managers of firms where bonus compensation is a higher proportion of total annual cash compensation will capitalize MSRs at higher levels (income increasing) than will managers at firms where bonus compensation is a lower proportion of total annual cash compensation. Managers subject to federal or state regulation will be influenced to make different accounting choices than will managers in an unregulated environment. Additionally, the relative importance of the debt-to-equity influence versus the regulatory influence is examined.; This study also examines the question of whether managers will make accounting choices outside the choices envisioned by the FASB. If given the opportunity, will managers capitalize MSRs under (over) their fair value? (Abstract shortened by UMI.)
机译：这项研究是在积极会计理论的背景下对金融服务业的考察，特别是因为它与抵押贷款服务活动有关。向从事抵押贷款服务的公司提供相对于抵押贷款服务权（MSR）资本化的会计选择。 《财务会计准则第125号声明》（斜体）要求对MSR进行大写。大写的机制很复杂，SFAS No. 125没有关于大写如何发生的特定规则和说明。缺乏具体的指导为经理们提供了一种会计选择。他们可以保守或大胆地利用MSR。这项研究是对经理在资本化MSR时所做选择的检验。本研究通过多种方式改进了先前的积极会计研究。这项研究使用了四年期间获得的面板数据，检查了可以作为连续因变量进行操作的会计选择，而不是将因变量作为虚拟变量进行操作以表明一个选择，而不是另一个，将所有货币独立变量作为连续变量是行业内研究，而不是横断面研究，并且是唯一的研究金融服务行业的研究。此外，这被认为是研究管理者是否会在财务会计准则委员会为他们选择的选择之外做出选择的问题的第一项研究。从积极会计理论中得出了五个假设。与小公司的经理相比，大公司的经理将MSR的资本化程度降低（收入减少）。负债权益比高的公司的经理将比债务权益比低的公司的经理以更高的水平（收益增加）资本化MSR。与奖金奖励在年度现金报酬总额中所占比例较低的公司的经理相比，奖金奖励在年度现金报酬总额中所占比例较高的公司的经理将资本化MSR的水平更高（收入增加）。与不受监管的环境中的管理人员相比，受联邦或州法规约束的管理人员将受到影响，以做出不同的会计选择。此外，还考察了债务对股权影响与监管影响之间的相对重要性。本研究还探讨了管理者是否会在FASB设想的选择之外做出会计选择的问题。如果有机会，管理者是否会以（超过）其公允价值将MSR资本化？ （摘要由UMI缩短。）

著录项

  • 作者

    Cochran, Robert James.;

  • 作者单位

    Virginia Commonwealth University.;

  • 授予单位 Virginia Commonwealth University.;
  • 学科 Business Administration Accounting.; Business Administration Banking.
  • 学位 Ph.D.
  • 年度 2001
  • 页码 130 p.
  • 总页数 130
  • 原文格式 PDF
  • 正文语种 eng
  • 中图分类 财务管理、经济核算;金融、银行;
  • 关键词

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