• 主题
高级搜索  >
历史搜索 清空历史
首页> 外文学位 >The strategic use of trade policy for non-trade purposes in multilateral and regional agreements.
【24h】

The strategic use of trade policy for non-trade purposes in multilateral and regional agreements.

机译：多边和区域协议中出于非贸易目的对贸易政策的战略性使用。

获取原文
获取原文并翻译 | 示例
页面导航
  • 摘要
  • 著录项
  • 相似文献
  • 相关主题

摘要

When, in international agreements, countries pursue reciprocal concessions across different issues—such as linking trade concessions to cooperation in environ mental issues—what are the consequences for the level of cooperation in each issue and for welfare? How do such linked agreements affect other agreements with third countries? These are some of the questions we address from the perspective of trade agreements. In all three essays, governments resort to self-enforcing international agreements to solve a prisoner's dilemma over multiple, possibly interdependent, dimensions in a repeated game framework.; In the first two chapters we show that if two policies used to control externalities are independent in the government's objective function then linkage—the ability to use both policies to punish non-compliance in either individual agreement—promotes cooperation in one policy at the expense of the other (e.g. strengthens environmental standards at the expense of higher tariffs). However, if the linked policies are not independent (e.g. a tariff on cars and an emissions tax) and if these policies are supermodular in the governments' objective function then more cooperation in both issues is feasible under linkage than under no-linkage.; The policies in our model satisfy the supermodularity condition only if the non-trade externality has a cross-border spillover and the weight on that externality's cost is sufficiently high. Moreover, when the lobbies in the import competing industry are sufficiently powerful the policies are not supermodular. Thus, our model addresses several prominent issues in the policy debates on linkage in the context of the WTO.; In the last chapter, we analyze the increasing number of regional agreements in which large developed countries offer lower effective trade barriers on the exports of smaller less developed ones, in exchange for explicit cooperation in non-trade issues. Among other things, we show that, even in the absence of trade creation or diversion effects, such regional agreements affect the levels of self-enforcing multilateral tariffs across regional blocks. Moreover, we show under what conditions the current rules regime, which allows linkages in regional agreements, arises as the optimal choice by large countries, even if it leads to higher multilateral tariffs among them.
机译：在国际协议中，当各国在不同问题上寻求对等的让步时，例如将贸易让步与环境问题上的合作联系起来，对每个问题上的合作水平和福利有何影响？这样的链接协议如何影响与第三国的其他协议？这些是我们从贸易​​协定的角度解决的一些问题。在所有这三篇文章中，政府都采取了自我执行的国际协议，以解决囚犯在重复博弈框架中多个可能相互依赖的维度上的困境。在前两章中，我们表明，如果用于控制外部性的两种政策在政府的目标职能中是独立的，那么联动（使用这两种政策来惩罚任一个人协议中的违规行为的能力）会促进一项政策的合作，而代价是另一个（例如，以更高的关税为代价加强环境标准）。但是，如果所链接的政策不是独立的（例如汽车关税和排放税），并且如果这些政策在政府的目标职能中是超模块化的，那么在链接下比在无链接下在这两个问题上更多的合作是可行的；仅当非贸易外部性具有跨境溢出且对该外部性成本的权重足够高时，我们模型中的策略才能满足超模块化条件。此外，当进口竞争行业中的游说机构足够强大时，这些政策就不是超模块化的。因此，我们的模型解决了在世贸组织背景下有关链接的政策辩论中的几个突出问题。在上一章中，我们分析了越来越多的区域协议，在这些协议中，大型发达国家对较小的欠发达国家的出口提供了较低的有效贸易壁垒，以换取在非贸易问题上的明确合作。除其他外，我们表明，即使在没有贸易创造或转移影响的情况下，此类区域协议也会影响跨区域区域的自我执行的多边关税水平。此外，我们展示了在何种条件下，允许区域协议相互联系的现行规则制度，是大国的最佳选择，即使这会导致其中更高的多边关税。

著录项

  • 作者

    Limao, Nuno Goncalo Abranches Barroso Monteiro.;

  • 作者单位

    Columbia University.;

  • 授予单位 Columbia University.;
  • 学科 Economics General.
  • 学位 Ph.D.
  • 年度 2001
  • 页码 192 p.
  • 总页数 192
  • 原文格式 PDF
  • 正文语种 eng
  • 中图分类 经济学;
  • 关键词

相似文献

  • 外文文献
  • 中文文献
  • 专利
获取原文

客服邮箱：kefu@zhangqiaokeyan.com

京公网安备：11010802029741号 ICP备案号：京ICP备15016152号-6 六维联合信息科技 (北京) 有限公司©版权所有

  • 客服微信

  • 服务号