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首页> 外文学位 >Pension fund managers, certified public accountants and actuaries: A principal -agent analysis of information provision.
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Pension fund managers, certified public accountants and actuaries: A principal -agent analysis of information provision.

机译：养老基金管理人，注册会计师和精算师：信息提供的委托-代理分析。

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摘要

We consider a model in which a principal (the pension fund administrator) employs agents (a certified public accountant and/or an actuary) to provide information about the state of the employee pension fund. In standard principal-agent models, increasing effort is associated with increasing output. In our model, increasing effort is associated with information structures that are more accurate. The administrator uses the information to take remedial action. We characterize the contracts and remedial action that result when the administrator contracts directly only with the actuary; when the administrator contracts directly with both the CPA and the actuary; and when the administrator contracts directly with the CPA, who then contracts directly with the actuary.;In this study, we have discussed the centralized contracting model and the decentralized contracting model. We conclude that if both agents have a higher unit cost of action and a higher reservation wage, then the principal's expected payoff in the decentralized contracting model is better than that in the centralized contracting model. On the other hand, if both agents have a lower unit cost of action and a lower reservation wage and the agent's risk attitude is more risk-averse, then the principal's expected payoff in the decentralized contracting model is worse than that in the centralized contracting model.;This study, in an agency theory context, sheds the light on the relationship between a pension fund administrator and his/her agent(s) and provides the pension administrator rules for using different contracting models in contracting with his/her agents.
机译：我们考虑一个模型，在该模型中，委托人（养老基金管理人）雇用代理人（注册会计师和/或精算师）来提供有关员工养老基金状态的信息。在标准的委托代理模型中，增加工作量与增加产出相关。在我们的模型中，越来越多的工作与更准确的信息结构相关联。管理员使用该信息采取补救措施。当管理员仅与精算师直接签约时，我们将描述合同和补救措施的特征。当管理员直接与注册会计师和精算师签订合同时；当管理员直接与CPA签约时，再与精算师直接签约。在本研究中，我们讨论了集中式签约模型和分散式签约模型。我们得出的结论是，如果两个代理都具有较高的单位诉讼成本和较高的保留工资，那么在分散式合同模型中委托人的预期收益将比集中式合同模型中的收益更高。另一方面，如果两个代理人的单位行为成本较低且保留工资较低，并且代理人的风险态度更倾向于规避风险，那么在分散式合同模型中委托人的预期收益会比集中式合同模型中的预期收益差在代理理论的背景下，这项研究阐明了养老金管理人与其代理人之间的关系，并提供了养老金管理人在与代理人订立合同时使用不同合同模型的规则。

著录项

  • 作者

    Wu, Jennjung.;

  • 作者单位

    University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign.;

  • 授予单位 University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign.;
  • 学科 Business Administration Accounting.;Economics Commerce-Business.
  • 学位 Ph.D.
  • 年度 2000
  • 页码 145 p.
  • 总页数 145
  • 原文格式 PDF
  • 正文语种 eng
  • 中图分类
  • 关键词

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