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首页> 外文学位 >Pricing *policies in oligopoly with product differentiation: The case of cellular telephony.
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Pricing *policies in oligopoly with product differentiation: The case of cellular telephony.

机译：定价*产品差异化下的寡头垄断政策：蜂窝电话的情况。

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摘要

Using data from cellular telephony in 1992, I examine the relationship between product differentiation and the pricing policies of oligopolists in a setting where entry and differentiation are mainly exogenous. In the case of cellular products, I find a positive relationship between price discrimination and product differentiation that is robust to different specifications; however, I cannot refute the hypothesis that the relationship between price discrimination and product differentiation is nonlinear. This positive relationship is consistent with models of competitive price discrimination that predict that discrimination decreases as direct competition, say as a result of entry, increases.;In the case of cellular technology, overall market power does not increase as firms become more differentiated. My study finds a negative relationship between price levels and product heterogeneity. Although the finding of a negative relationship between differentiation and price levels may be the result of an inability to measure the true average price paid by consumers, the finding might also reflect a reduction in consumer valuation for cellular when coverage is not comprehensive.;I find it plausible that the more differentiated cellular carriers are, the more likely it is that cellular users will have a preference for a particular carrier. Hence, as differentiation increases, the cross-firm elasticities of demand that firms face decrease. Perhaps a decline in the cross-firm elasticities of demand enables firms to discriminate more in heterogeneous markets. However, as differentiation increases, consumer valuation for cellular services decreases. Increased differentiation engenders an increase in the industry elasticities of demand, constraining the level of cellular prices. From the examination of pricing policies in cellular telephony it is clear that price discrimination and price levels in oligopoly markets may not be easily characterized by conjecturing from models of price discrimination in monopoly markets. The introduction of the cross-firm elasticity of demand may produce effects that do not completely follow from intuition. Despite obstructions from unexpected effects and scarce theoretical work, I am confident that my findings contribute to the body of empirical work in the area of competitive price discrimination.
机译：我使用1992年来自移动电话的数据，研究了产品差异化和寡头垄断者定价政策之间的关系，这种情况下进入和差异化主要是外生的。对于蜂窝产品，我发现价格歧视与产品差异之间存在正相关关系，这种差异对不同的规格具有鲁棒性。但是，我不能反驳价格歧视与产品差异之间的关系是非线性的这一假设。这种正向关系与竞争价格歧视模型相一致，该模型预测，随着直接竞争（例如进入进入），歧视会随着直接竞争的增加而减少。在蜂窝技术的情况下，随着公司的差异化，总体市场力量不会增加。我的研究发现价格水平与产品异质性之间存在负相关关系。尽管发现差异和价格水平之间存在负相关关系可能是由于无法衡量消费者支付的真实平均价格的结果，但是当覆盖范围不全面时，该发现也可能反映出蜂窝电话的消费者估值下降。可能的是，蜂窝运营商的分化程度越高，蜂窝用户越有可能会偏爱特定的运营商。因此，随着差异的增加，企业面临的需求的跨公司弹性降低。跨企业需求弹性的下降也许使企业能够在异类市场中进行更多区分。但是，随着差异化的增加，蜂窝服务的消费者评估会降低。差异化的加剧导致行业需求弹性的增加，从而限制了蜂窝价格的水平。通过研究蜂窝电话的定价政策，可以清楚地看出，垄断市场中的价格歧视模型可能无法轻易地描绘出寡头市场中的价格歧视和价格水平。需求的跨公司弹性的引入可能产生的效果并非凭直觉就能完全得出。尽管受到意想不到的影响和理论工作的匮乏的阻碍，但我有信心，我的发现有助于竞争性价格歧视领域的实证研究。

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  • 作者

    Marciano, Sonia Daryanani.;

  • 作者单位

    The University of Chicago.;

  • 授予单位 The University of Chicago.;
  • 学科 Economics Commerce-Business.
  • 学位 Ph.D.
  • 年度 2000
  • 页码 93 p.
  • 总页数 93
  • 原文格式 PDF
  • 正文语种 eng
  • 中图分类 宗教;
  • 关键词

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