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首页> 外文学位 >Cheap talk in a timing game, double layered talk and multilayered talk.
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Cheap talk in a timing game, double layered talk and multilayered talk.

机译：计时游戏中的廉价谈话，双层谈话和多层谈话。

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摘要

My dissertation studies strategic information transmission through costless messages, which is often referred to as "cheap talk". The first chapter studies cheap talk in a setting where time plays an important role. The second chapter studies a situation when a decision maker and an expert communicate through a medium. The third chapter extends the second chapter to multiple mediums.;In the first chapter, when time is incorporated into cheap talk, this kind of game has a special feature. Over the course of the game, the decision maker's action set shrinks as time passes. The expert, who has the information for decision making, chooses a time to send a signal to the decision maker, who does not have any information and seeks advice from the expert to make a timely decision. Then the decision maker chooses a time to take an action, which determines the welfare of both players. I characterize the set of Bayesian equilibria for the case of quadratic utility and a uniform prior. The main findings of this paper are as follows. First, there is a large set of equilibria, which includes all CS equilibria and delegation equilibria. Second, the decision maker must set a T such that she will take action immediately if she does not receive any message before or at T, and the value of T depends on the size of the interest conflict between the two players. Third, the characteristics of the equilibrium highly depend on this stop time. Fourth, the set of action times later than T, but induced by a message sent at time earlier than T, is finite.;The second chapter studies a situation when a decision maker and an expert communicate through a medium, who strategically translates the expert's message to the decision maker. The expert sends a message to the medium, then the medium sends a message to the decision maker based on the message he has received, and finally the decision maker takes action based on the medium's message. By adding a medium in communication, both the expert and the decision maker have to take the medium's personal interests into account. The main findings are as follows. First, in an equilibrium where the expert can control the medium's behavior, with quadratic utility, information loss need not occur and the expert and the decision maker communicate as if they did so directly. Second, the decision maker can improve his welfare by choosing a medium with opposite interests to the expert.;In the third chapter, I study cheap talk with multiple mediums. I show that if all senders have positive bias, then at most one medium will affect the equilibrium. If some have negative bias and some have positive, then at most two mediums are relevant.
机译：我的论文研究了通过无价信息传递战略性信息，这通常被称为“廉价交谈”。第一章研究在时间起着重要作用的环境中的廉价谈话。第二章研究了决策者和专家通过媒体交流的情况。第三章将第二章扩展到多种媒介。在第一章中，当时间融入廉价谈话时，这种游戏就具有特殊的功能。在整个游戏过程中，决策者的动作集会随着时间的流逝而缩小。具有用于决策的信息的专家选择时间向没有任何信息的决策者发送信号，并寻求专家的意见以做出及时的决策。然后，决策者选择采取行动的时间，这决定了双方参与者的福利。对于二次效用和统一先验的情况，我描述了贝叶斯均衡集。本文的主要发现如下。首先，存在大量的均衡，包括所有CS均衡和委托均衡。其次，决策者必须设置一个T，以便如果她在T之前或T之前没有收到任何消息，她将立即采取行动，T的值取决于两个参与者之间利益冲突的大小。第三，平衡的特性高度依赖于该停止时间。第四，动作时间的集合晚于T，但由早于T的时间发送的消息引起，这是有限的。给决策者的信息。专家将消息发送到介质，然后介质根据接收到的消息将消息发送给决策者，最后决策者根据介质的消息采取措施。通过添加交流媒介，专家和决策者都必须考虑该媒介的个人利益。主要发现如下。首先，在专家可以用二次效用控制介质行为的平衡中，无需发生信息丢失，专家与决策者可以直接进行交流。其次，决策者可以通过选择一种与专家兴趣相反的媒介来改善自己的福利。在第三章中，我研究了多种媒介的廉价对话。我表明，如果所有发件人都具有正偏见，那么最多一种媒介会影响均衡。如果有些带有负偏见，有些带有正偏见，那么至多两个媒介是相关的。

著录项

  • 作者

    Yu, Zhiyuan.;

  • 作者单位

    Boston University.;

  • 授予单位 Boston University.;
  • 学科 Economics Theory.
  • 学位 Ph.D.
  • 年度 2009
  • 页码 72 p.
  • 总页数 72
  • 原文格式 PDF
  • 正文语种 eng
  • 中图分类 经济学;
  • 关键词

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