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Improving compliance with environmental regulations: Targeted enforcement and self-audits.

机译：改善对环境法规的遵守：有针对性的执法和自我审计。

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摘要

The resources available for the enforcement of environmental regulations are typically limited. By focusing attention on certain segments of the regulated community, and encouraging industry self-policing, enforcement agencies can more effectively use their limited resources. These two innovative approaches to enforcement, adopted by the United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), are examined in this thesis.; in Part 1, targeted monitoring and enforcement is considered. Firms are divided into two groups, with the enforcement agency concentrating its resources on firms in the target group. The agency chooses the inspection frequency and fine in each group, along with the transition structure by which firms move from one group to the other. Firms in the non-target group are not inspected, but are moved at random into the target group. In the target group, inspection occurs with some positive probability, and when found in violation, the firm is assessed the maximum fine possible. Escape from the target group occurs only when an inspection reveals the firm is in compliance. This scheme creates an additional reward for compliance, reducing the required inspection frequency compared to a scheme with simple random escape. The range of parameter values for which this optimal solution is feasible, however, is limited. Past compliance targeting, where firms with a history of violation are moved to the target group, is considered as an alternative.; In Part II, the EPA's “audit policy” is examined. This policy, designed to encourage industry self-policing, was introduced in December 1995 and authorizes reduced penalties for firms that voluntarily conduct self-audits and report any discovered violations to the EPA. To be eligible, the firm must also correct the violation. A simple model is developed to explore the effect of penalty mitigation on the firm's incentive to undertake self-audits. It is shown that full penalty mitigation should be granted to firms that audit, and then correct and report any violations. No penalty relief should be granted to firms that simply conduct a self-audit, but fail to take any further action.
机译：用于执行环境法规的资源通常是有限的。通过将注意力集中在受监管社区的某些部分上，并鼓励行业自我监管，执法机构可以更有效地利用其有限的资源。本文研究了美国环境保护署（EPA）采用的这两种创新的执法方法。在第1部分中，考虑了有针对性的监视和执行。公司分为两组，执行机构将资源集中在目标组中的公司上。代理商选择每组的检查频率和罚款，以及企业从一组转移到另一组的过渡结构。不检查非目标组中的公司，而是将其随机移动到目标组中。在目标群体中，检查的发生几率是肯定的，如果发现违规，则将对公司进行可能的最高罚款。仅当检查显示企业合规时，才可以逃离目标群体。与具有简单随机逃逸的方案相比，该方案为遵守提供了额外的奖励，从而减少了所需的检查频率。但是，此最佳解决方案可行的参数值范围受到限制。过去的合规目标是将具有违规历史的公司移至目标组的目标。在第二部分中，审查了EPA的“审核政策”。这项旨在鼓励行业自我监管的政策于1995年12月推出，它授权对自愿进行自我审计并向EPA报告任何发现的违规行为的公司减少处罚。为了符合条件，公司还必须纠正违规行为。开发了一个简单的模型来探索减轻处罚对公司进行自我审计的动机的影响。结果表明，应给予审核公司以纠正，报告任何违规行为的全部罚款。对于仅进行自我审计但未采取任何进一步行动的公司，不应给予任何罚款减免。

著录项

  • 作者

    Friesen, Lana.;

  • 作者单位

    Simon Fraser University (Canada).;

  • 授予单位 Simon Fraser University (Canada).;
  • 学科 Economics Commerce-Business.; Political Science Public Administration.; Environmental Sciences.
  • 学位 Ph.D.
  • 年度 1999
  • 页码 170 p.
  • 总页数 170
  • 原文格式 PDF
  • 正文语种 eng
  • 中图分类 贸易经济;政治理论;环境科学基础理论;
  • 关键词

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