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首页> 外文学位 >AN EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION OF THE IMPLICATIONS OF EMPLOYEE OWNERSHIP FOR THE AGENCY PROBLEM AND THE INFORMATION CONTENT OF EARNINGS.
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AN EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION OF THE IMPLICATIONS OF EMPLOYEE OWNERSHIP FOR THE AGENCY PROBLEM AND THE INFORMATION CONTENT OF EARNINGS.

机译：雇员所有权对代理问题和收益信息含量的影响的实证研究。

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摘要

This dissertation examines the association between firm performance and the ownership stake of employees of the firm. It has two objectives: (1) to assess the impact of employee ownership on the agency problem, which arises from separation of ownership and control of the firm, and (2) to investigate the implications of employee ownership for the information content of earnings.; Prior research (Faria et al., 1993, Conte, 1992, Rosen, 1990, Bloom 1985) indicates that employee stock ownership plans (ESOPs) do not achieve the objectives of a performance-enhancing benefit plan. However, evidence suggests that ESOPs are being used to increase management's effective level of control of the firm without increasing its ownership stake.; One explanation for prior studies' failure to document a significant association between firm performance and employee ownership is that the time horizons used to measure performance are too short for the alleged performance-enhancing benefits of the ESOP to be realized. To address this concern, this dissertation is designed as a long-term association study. For each firm in the ESOP sample, a control (non-ESOP) firm is selected by matching on industry and size. Longitudinal data for ninety-six pairs of public firms comprise the data set.; The pre-adoption and post-adoption performance of the ESOP firms is compared to that of the non-ESOP firms. A series of nonparametric tests provides no evidence that ESOPs improve firm performance. However, results are consistent with ESOPs being used by management as corporate control devices. The overall conclusion is that ESOPs do not mitigate the agency problem.; Warfield et al. (1995) assert that the separation of ownership and control of the firm affects the information content of earnings. They document a positive association between managerial ownership and the earnings response coefficient (ERC). Although stock price reactions to ESOP adoptions suggest that changes in the level of employee ownership contain value-relevant information, no study to date has examined the impact employee ownership on the information content of earnings. This dissertation builds on the results of Warfield et al. (1995). It is the first study to provide evidence that the presence of an ESOP has a positive impact on the ERC and that this effect becomes weaker as the ESOP matures. The results of empirical tests of the relationship between managerial ownership and the earnings response coefficient are mixed.
机译：本文考察了企业绩效与企业员工所有权之间的关系。它有两个目标：（1）评估员工所有权对代理权问题的影响，该问题是由所有权和公司控制权分离引起的；（2）研究员工所有权对收益信息内容的影响。 ;先前的研究（Faria等，1993； Conte，1992； Rosen，1990； Bloom 1985）表明，员工持股计划（ESOP）并未达到绩效提升福利计划的目标。但是，有证据表明，使用ESOP可以提高管理层对公司的有效控制水平，而无需增加其所有权。先前研究未能证明公司绩效与员工所有权之间存在显着关联的一种解释是，用于衡量绩效的时间跨度太短，无法实现所谓的ESOP的绩效提升收益。为了解决这个问题，本论文被设计为一项长期的关联研究。对于ESOP样本中的每个公司，通过匹配行业和规模来选择一个对照（非ESOP）公司。九十六对公共公司的纵向数据构成数据集。将ESOP公司的收养前后业绩与非ESOP公司的收养前后进行比较。一系列非参数测试没有证据表明ESOP可以改善公司绩效。但是，结果与管理层用作公司控制设备的ESOP一致。总体结论是，ESOP并不能减轻代理问题。沃菲尔德等。 （1995）断言公司所有权和控制权的分离会影响收益的信息内容。他们记录了管理者所有权与收益响应系数（ERC）之间的正相关关系。尽管股票价格对采用ESOP的反应表明员工持股水平的变化包含与价值相关的信息，但迄今为止，尚无研究检查员工持股对收入信息内容的影响。本文基于Warfield等人的研究结果。 （1995）。这是第一项提供证据证明ESOP的存在对ERC有积极影响的证据，并且随着ESOP的成熟，这种影响会减弱。管理层所有权与收益响应系数之间关系的实证检验结果是混合的。

著录项

  • 作者

    LOUGEE, BARBARA ANN.;

  • 作者单位

    CORNELL UNIVERSITY.;

  • 授予单位 CORNELL UNIVERSITY.;
  • 学科 Business Administration Accounting.; Economics Finance.
  • 学位 PH.D.
  • 年度 1999
  • 页码 117 p.
  • 总页数 117
  • 原文格式 PDF
  • 正文语种 eng
  • 中图分类 财务管理、经济核算;财政、金融;
  • 关键词

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