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Collective interests, institutional innovation, and the development of the United States Congress.

机译：集体利益，体制创新和美国国会的发展。

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摘要

In this dissertation, I argue that the key features of Congressional organization are not best viewed as the solution to a single collective goods problem, but rather are better understood as the products of "disjointed pluralism." By disjointed pluralism, I mean that no single kind of coalitional interest exerts a dominant impact on the design of legislative institutions, and that the interactions and tensions among competing coalitions promoting a range of collective interests drive the dynamics of institutional development. The coalitional interest in majority party reputation, for example, has to compete with members' shared interest in district-based particularism, and with members' pursuit of ideological success through cross-party coalitions.;I examine the relationship between the multiple collective interests shared by members and the kind of legislature that they build over time by identifying and analyzing important institutional changes in four periods of Congressional history, 1890-1910, 1919-1932, 1937-1952, and 1970-1989. My case studies show that different interests emerge as particularly important in different eras, that multiple collective interests typically shape each instance of institutional change, and that specific institutions often develop through an accumulation of innovations inspired by competing motives, engendering a tense layering of new arrangements on top of preexisting structures. My findings suggest that Congressional institutions are made up of the often ambiguous or contradictory results of disjointed, pluralistic change processes.
机译：在这篇论文中，我认为，国会组织的关键特征不应该最好地看作是解决单个集体物品问题的解决方案，而应该更好地理解为“脱节的多元主义”的产物。脱节的多元主义，我的意思是，没有一种单一的联盟利益对立法机构的设计产生主要影响，并且竞争联盟之间促进一系列集体利益的相互作用和紧张关系驱动着机构发展的动力。例如，对多数党声誉的联盟利益必须与成员对基于地区的特殊性的共同利益进行竞争，并与成员通过跨党派的联盟追求意识形态上的成功进行竞争。我研究了共享的多个集体利益之间的关系。通过确定和分析国会历史上四个时期（1890-1910、1919-1932、1937-1952和1970-1989）的重要制度变迁而建立的立法机构以及他们随时间推移建立的立法机构。我的案例研究表明，不同的利益在不同的时代变得尤为重要，多个集体利益通常影响着制度变迁的每个实例，而特定的制度通常是通过竞争动机激发的创新积累而发展起来的，从而形成了新安排的紧张层次在现有结构之上。我的发现表明，国会机构是由脱节的，多元化的变革过程中通常是模棱两可或矛盾的结果组成的。

著录项

  • 作者

    Schickler, Eric.;

  • 作者单位

    Yale University.;

  • 授予单位 Yale University.;
  • 学科 Political science.;American history.
  • 学位 Ph.D.
  • 年度 1997
  • 页码 515 p.
  • 总页数 515
  • 原文格式 PDF
  • 正文语种 eng
  • 中图分类
  • 关键词

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