Congress exercised control over trade policy until 1930, but since then has delegated authority to the president. Three principal schools of thought seek to explain this turnabout. One identifies trade as a battle between competing domestic interests (parochialism), another emphasizes the power of liberal economic ideas, and the third stresses the fact that trade has become a branch of foreign policy. I argue that the parochial explanation still presents the most persuasive case, and legislators continue to seek particularistic benefits for their constituents, but this approach must be updated to account for innovations since the 1930s.;Senators' parochialism is reflected both in work and in deed. Probit analysis of Senate votes in the 1930s, 1960s, and 1980s supports the contention that lawmakers base their decisions on the expressed interests of industries in their constituencies. Content analysis of communications between senators and their constituents show that particularistic benefits still matter, and that incumbents who deliver these benefits enjoy advantages over their challenges.;The consequences of senatorial trade politics are shown in an examination of two key initiatives from the 1980s, as a case study in the interactions between the executive and legislative branches. The analysis also elaborates upon the linkages between domestic trade policies and international economic relations, and explores the broader effects of these developments for the trading system. The bargaining between the executive and legislative branches produces an ever-widening range of issues that fall under the jurisdiction of the trading system (e.g. services and labor rights), while also encouraging the adoption of discriminatory and retaliatory approaches to trade negotiations.;The principal innovation concerns the policy preferences of constituents and legislators Parochialism is no longer expressed solely as protectionism; trade liberalization and other means of promoting exports, including reciprocity laws, are now more prominent. Moreover, legislators do not rely exclusively on the enactment of legislation to obtain benefits for their constituents. When presidents seek approval for their plans in trade policy, members of Congress engage in pluralist barter. They approve presidential requests only after they get concessions for local industries. Legislators also use casework as a means of extracting favors.
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