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A Kantian critique of artificial intelligence through the conceptual lens of irony

机译：通过反讽的概念镜头对康德式人工智能的批判

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摘要

This study shall be concerned with exploring fundamental limits of the artificial intelligence (AI) effort to simulate human cognition via machine artifacts. After fifty years of research in conjunction with enormous strides in the technological sphere, AI has failed to deliver on its promises to create synthetic entities capable of equaling, or even exceeding, human intelligence. In fact, even with today's super computers, AI researchers have been unable to reduplicate the cognitive achievements of a two year old child, not to mention a fully developed human intellect. Why is this the case? Is there some invisible ceiling which AI has been unwittingly up against?;I argue that there is indeed just such a fundamental limit having to do not only with the polyvalence of what constitutes human "reason," but also the dialectical nature of human communication which manifests through our pragmatic use of irony. My effort, therefore, shall be a return to an essentially Kantian metaphysical inquiry in order to account for AI's lack of critical clarity concerning the nature and limits of what amounts to its own unique and courageous gedanken experiment. In spite of Dreyfus's claim that there has been no adduction so far of an apriori critique against the possibility of a synthetic intelligence, I will attempt to do just such a dialectical assessment of the limits of AI from the transcendental point of view proffered by Kantian dialectic. Finally, I shall ground what might otherwise be a free-floating speculative exercise through referring to the praxis of our distributed cognition and communication, using the human ability to negotiate irony as that demonstration.
机译：这项研究应关注探索通过机器伪像模拟人类认知的人工智能（AI）努力的基本局限性。经过五十年的研究以及技术领域的巨大进步，人工智能未能兑现其创建能够等同甚至超过人类智能的合成实体的诺言。实际上，即使使用当今的超级计算机，人工智能研究人员也无法重现两岁孩子的认知成就，更不用说全面发展的人类智力了。为什么会这样呢？ AI是否有不经意间达到的无形的上限？；我认为确实存在这样一个基本的限制，不仅与构成人类“原因”的多重性有关，还与人类交流的辩证性质有关。通过我们对反讽的务实体现。因此，我的努力将是回归到本质上是康德式的形而上学问题，以便解释AI缺乏关于其本质和局限性的严格清晰度，而这种本质和局限性在于它本身独特而勇敢的《变种》实验。尽管Dreyfus声称到目前为止，尚无关于合成智能可能性的先验批评，但我将尝试从康德方言提供的先验观点对AI的局限性进行这样的辩证评估。 。最后，我将参考人类分布式的讽刺和交流能力，通过参考我们的分布式认知和交流的实践，来探讨自由浮动的投机活动。

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  • 作者

    Showkowy, William Nicholas.;

  • 作者单位

    Emory University.;

  • 授予单位 Emory University.;
  • 学科 Science history.;Computer science.;Philosophy.;Artificial intelligence.
  • 学位 Ph.D.
  • 年度 1995
  • 页码 204 p.
  • 总页数 204
  • 原文格式 PDF
  • 正文语种 eng
  • 中图分类
  • 关键词

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