This dissertation is composed of four essays sharing one common theme: international trade is often conducted by oligopolistic firms, and as a result, taxes and subsidies may be employed as strategic devices designed to influence the subsequent terms of firm competition.; In the opening essay, I reexamine the conclusion that the optimum tariff is potentially larger than the revenue maximizing tariff under Cournot oligopoly, reversing a neoclassical trade proposition. Sensitivity analysis is performed on this result by including variables such as product heterogeneity, firm cross-ownership, non-traded complementary goods, and Bertrand conduct in various models of oligopolistic rivalry. I conclude that the above factors tend to restore the conventional tariff hierarchy.; In the second essay, I reexamine the result that domestic countervailing duties vitiate the argument for an optimal foreign export subsidy by assuming the presence of firm cross-ownership. In this scenario, a portion of the foreign export subsidy represents a direct transfer of funds from foreign taxpayers to domestic consumers. While this dampens the motive for export subsidization, firm cross-ownership also lowers the magnitude of the domestic countervailing response, which reinforces the argument for an optimal foreign export subsidy. I conclude that the former effect dominates the latter, and consequently, that firm cross-ownership reinforces the argument for an optimal export tax.; The third essay examines the possibility that unilateral actions exist which simultaneously benefit both trading countries. Under Cournot competition, a foreign export subsidy is Pareto-improving if demands are not too concave, and additionally, if the traded good is consumed domestically. This contrasts strongly with Bertrand competition, where Pareto-improving foreign export taxes are more likely to exist in the absence of domestic consumption. Lastly, I derive conditions under which a Pareto-improving, Cournot import tariff exists, disproving the notion that the optimum tariff is necessarily a beggar-thy-neighbor policy.; In my final essay, I determine that the confluence of oligopolistic pricing and demand curvature potentially yields an outcome where the optimal export tax exceeds the revenue maximizing export tax. This result necessitates that home firm profits increase with the imposition of an export duty, which only occurs if demands are sufficiently convex.
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