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首页> 外文学位 >AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF TAXABLE STOCK DISTRIBUTIONS: THE EFFECT OF TAX AND REGULATORY ACTIONS IN INFORMATIONALLY ASYMMETRIC MARKETS.
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AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF TAXABLE STOCK DISTRIBUTIONS: THE EFFECT OF TAX AND REGULATORY ACTIONS IN INFORMATIONALLY ASYMMETRIC MARKETS.

机译：税收分配的实证分析：税收和规制措施对信息不对称市场的影响。

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摘要

This thesis investigates two types of taxable stock distributions: taxable spinoffs and taxable stock dividends-in-kind (SDIK) distributions. The objective is to document any abnormal performance associated with these distributions and to design an explanatory model consistent with these findings.; Parent companies of taxable spinoffs exhibit a significant announcement effect of 2.86% (p = 0.0001). A cross-sectional analysis of taxable spinoff long-term performance uncovered tax and regulatory effects. Taxable spinoffs announced from 1965 through 1969 exhibited an abnormal buy-and-hold return of {dollar}-{dollar}53.79% (p = 0.0001) in month 24 and {dollar}-{dollar}66.36% (p = 0.0001) in month 60. Parent firms may spinoff very small companies with limited growth options rather than pursue initial public offerings (IPOs) that would entail costly and intrusive filing requirements. Regulatory action in 1969 and 1970 ended this incentive by requiring similar filings of spinoffs and IPOs.; From 1979 through 1986, spinoff companies exhibit an abnormal buy-and-hold return of 35.72% (p = 0.0384) in month 12 and 49.25% (p = 0.0264) in month 24. Parent firms may be motivated by federal tax incentives to spinoff oil and gas interests and form trusts taxed only at the shareholder level. Apart from these tax and regulatory influences, taxable spinoffs returns are similar to those of non-taxable spinoffs.; Distributed companies of taxable SDIKs exhibit a significant announcement effect of {dollar}-{dollar}3.03% (p = 0.0414). As the proportion of the distributed companies' total stock is distributed in an SDIK, the stronger is the negative announcement effect. Parent companies may have monitoring responsibilities, and can better determine when the distributed company is overvalued. A cross-sectional analysis reveals that significant negative long-term performance is well represented across time, industries, and exchanges. However, financial companies exhibit consistently positive aggregate returns up to 60 months. This anomaly may be influenced by the 1970 BHCA Amendment that required separation of banking and other financial activities. The forced divestiture of banking concerns positively influenced the otherwise negative performance of taxable SDIKs. When financial companies are removed from the sample, SDIKs are found to generate strong negative post-announcement returns up to 60 months.
机译：本文研究了两种类型的应税股票分布：应税衍生产品和应税股票实物股息（SDIK）分布。目的是记录与这些分布相关的任何异常表现，并设计一个与这些发现一致的解释模型。应税剥离的母公司的公告效应显着为2.86％（p = 0.0001）。对应税衍生公司长期业绩的横断面分析发现了税收和监管影响。从1965年到1969年宣布的应税衍生产品在第24个月出现了{dollar}-{dollar} 53.79％（p = 0.0001）的不正常购买和持有收益，而在2006个月的{dollar}-{dollar} 66.36％（p = 0.0001）每月60.母公司可能会剥离成长选择有限的非常小的公司，而不是进行会涉及昂贵且侵入性文件要求的首次公开募股（IPO）。 1969年和1970年的监管行动通过要求类似的分拆和IPO申请结束了这一激励。从1979年到1986年，分拆公司在第12个月和第24个月的非正常持有和持有回报率分别为35.72％（p = 0.0384）和49.25％（p = 0.0264）。母公司可能受到联邦税收优惠政策的激励而产生石油和天然气权益和形式信托仅在股东一级征税。除了这些税收和监管影响之外，应税衍生品收益与非应税衍生品相似。应纳税SDIK的分布式公司的公告效应显着达到{dollar}-{dollar} 3.03％（p = 0.0414）。由于已分配公司的总股本中的比例以SDIK分配，因此负面公告效应越强。母公司可能负有监督责任，并且可以更好地确定分布式公司何时被高估。横断面分析显示，在时间，行业和交流中，长期负绩效表现良好。但是，金融公司在60个月内始终表现出正的总收益。此异常可能受1970年BHCA修正案的影响，该修正案要求银行业务与其他金融活动分开。银行业资产的强制剥离对应税SDIK的负面影响产生了积极影响。从样本中删除金融公司后，发现SDIK会在60个月内产生强烈的负面公告后收益。

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  • 作者

    WOOLFOLK, MICHAEL JONATHAN.;

  • 作者单位

    THE PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIVERSITY.;

  • 授予单位 THE PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIVERSITY.;
  • 学科 Economics Finance.; Business Administration General.
  • 学位 PH.D.
  • 年度 1995
  • 页码 154 p.
  • 总页数 154
  • 原文格式 PDF
  • 正文语种 eng
  • 中图分类 财政、金融;贸易经济;
  • 关键词

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