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Essays on the protection of intellectual property rights and North-South technology transfer.

机译：关于知识产权保护和南北技术转让的论文。

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摘要

One of the subjects under discussion at the Uruguay Round for the last 4 years has been the introduction of strengthened protection of intellectual property rights (IPR's) in underdeveloped countries. This issue has polarized countries into the rich, Northern countries who undertake R&D and stand to lose from lack of enforcement of IPR's, and Southern countries which are more concerned with acquiring goods at lower prices than with encouraging R&D. Recent literature has also argued that there are few incentives for Southern countries to enforce protection of IPR's.; The infringement of intellectual property rights by Southern underdeveloped countries can pose a significant risk for foreign innovators wishing to license the production of new techniques to these countries. The first essay examines this problem in an asymmetric information context, where only the Southern country knows whether patents will be protected or not. The incentives of the Southern country to protect patents depend on what share of the profits from licensing they are allowed to retain. If the South is allowed to keep some of its profits, then depending on the probability with which it can imitate, the South may have an incentive to protect patents.; In the second chapter, I develop a model of technology transfer where the Northern firm has the choice of exporting, licensing, or producing through foreign direct investment (FDI), some new product. The Southern government's incentives to protect patents or to allow FDI are examined in an asymmetric information game where the innovating firm does not know whether the South can imitate the technology or not.; The theoretical results suggest that internalizing foreign production through FDI allows the Northern firm to reduce the risk of imitation through licensing. If the Northern firm can choose between all three strategies, FDI will be optimal when there is a high probability of imitation. Empirical evidence also supports the conclusion that licensing is not significantly affected by patent policy in the South, there being a positive correlation between countries which allow patent infringements and those with the highest ratios of licensing to FDI.; The third essay examines the welfare issues involved when the innovation to be licensed is a cost reducing process innovation. We find that licensing contracts consisting of up front fees alone may preferred by Southern countries to imitation, in fact, these contracts tend to maximize world welfare as well. The optimal patent policy for Southern governments may not be patent infringement but some restrictions on the form of licensing contracts. When process innovations are compared with product innovations, with the same cost structure, we find that since product innovations are never licensed, it may not be optimal for patent protection to cover new products.
机译：在过去的四年中，乌拉圭回合讨论的主题之一是在欠发达国家引入加强的知识产权保护（IPR）。这个问题使两极分化为富裕国家，进行研发并因缺乏知识产权执法而蒙受损失的北方国家，以及更关心以较低价格获得商品而不是鼓励研发的南方国家。最近的文献也认为，南方国家几乎没有激励措施来加强对知识产权的保护。南部不发达国家侵犯知识产权可能给希望将新技术生产许可给这些国家的外国创新者带来重大风险。第一篇文章在不对称的信息环境中研究了这个问题，只有南部国家才能知道专利是否将受到保护。南部国家保护专利的动机取决于允许保留的许可收益中的份额。如果允许南方保留一些利润，那么根据其模仿的可能性，南方可能会鼓励保护专利。在第二章中，我开发了一种技术转让模型，其中北方公司可以选择出口，许可或通过外国直接投资（FDI）生产某些新产品。在一个不对称的信息博弈中研究了南方政府保护专利或允许外国直接投资的动机，在这种情况下，创新公司不知道南方是否可以模仿该技术。理论结果表明，通过外国直接投资对外国生产进行内部化可以使北方公司降低通过许可获得模仿的风险。如果北方公司可以在所有三种策略之间进行选择，那么当模仿的可能性很高时，外国直接投资将是最佳选择。经验证据也支持以下结论：在南部，许可并未受到专利政策的明显影响，允许专利侵权的国家与许可与外国直接投资比率最高的国家之间存在正相关关系；第三篇文章探讨了要获得许可的创新是降低成本的过程创新时涉及的福利问题。我们发现，仅由前期费用组成的许可合同可能会被南方国家取代，而实际上，这些合同也倾向于使世界福利最大化。南方政府的最佳专利政策可能不是专利侵权，而是对许可合同形式的一些限制。将流程创新与具有相同成本结构的产品创新进行比较时，我们发现由于产品创新从未获得许可，因此专利保护可能不适用于覆盖新产品。

著录项

  • 作者

    Vishwasrao, Sharmila V.;

  • 作者单位

    Purdue University.;

  • 授予单位 Purdue University.;
  • 学科 Economics General.
  • 学位 Ph.D.
  • 年度 1991
  • 页码 142 p.
  • 总页数 142
  • 原文格式 PDF
  • 正文语种 eng
  • 中图分类 经济学;
  • 关键词

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