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首页> 外文学位 >EXCLUSIVE DEALING CONTRACTS AND THEIR RELATION TO TYING CONTRACTS: AN ECONOMIC AND LEGAL ANALYSIS. (VOLUMES I AND II).
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EXCLUSIVE DEALING CONTRACTS AND THEIR RELATION TO TYING CONTRACTS: AN ECONOMIC AND LEGAL ANALYSIS. (VOLUMES I AND II).

机译：独家交易合同及其与捆绑合同的关系：经济和法律分析。 （第一和第二卷）。

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摘要

A supply contract can be thought of as an agreement which defines the terms under which a good is transferred from a seller (lessor) to a buyer (lessee). Since much and perhaps most of economic activity does not take place in instantaneous auction markets, it follows that supply contracts play a very fundamental role in the economy. Hence the study of supply contracts is an important task for economists. This dissertation focuses on one particular type of supply contract, namely, the exclusive dealing contract. Limited discussions of supply contracts on a broader level are also present.; Chapter one reviews the literature on exclusive dealing contracts. This review reveals that the topic of anticompetitive effects from exclusive dealing contracts has received very little rigorous analysis. Chapter two provides a theoretical model which demonstrates that exclusive dealing contracts can indeed have anticompetitive effects. Hence the results of chapter two support the contention that there is need for a considerable amount of economic research in the area of supply contracts.; Chapter three attempts to extend the model of chapter two by removing one of the assumptions underlying that model.; Another special type of supply contract is the tying contract. This type of contract is related to the exclusive dealing contract in a policy-relevant manner. Indeed, even the distinction between the two types of contracts on a purely definitional level is a matter of some debate. Chapter four reviews the literature on the tying contract.; Chapter five (i) provides a methodology for systematically organizing from a supply contract perspective a large number of factual situations, and (ii) employs this methodology to all the antitrust cases which have reached the (federal) Courts of Appeals level or higher. Chapter six (i) provides some generalizations with respect to the findings of chapter five, and (ii) delineates in a precise fashion some areas in which further research is needed.
机译：可以将供应合同视为一项协议，该协议定义了商品从卖方（出租人）转移到买方（承租人）的条款。由于大多数经济活动可能不是在即时拍卖市场中发生的，因此，供应合同在经济中起着非常重要的作用。因此，对供应合同的研究是经济学家的一项重要任务。本文着眼于一种特殊类型的供应合同，即排他性交易合同。还对供应合同进行了更广泛的讨论。第一章回顾了独家交易合同的文献。这项审查表明，排他性交易合同产生的反竞争影响这一主题很少受到严格的分析。第二章提供了一个理论模型，证明了排他性交易合同确实可以产生反竞争作用。因此，第二章的结果支持以下论点：在供应合同领域需要进行大量的经济研究。第三章试图通过删除该模型的基础假设之一来扩展第二章的模型。供应合同的另一种特殊类型是捆绑合同。这种类型的合同以政策相关的方式与排他性交易合同相关。的确，即使在纯粹的定义层面上，两种合同之间的区别也存在争议。第四章回顾了有关捆绑合同的文献。第五章（i）提供了一种从供应合同角度系统地组织大量事实情况的方法，并且（ii）将这种方法应用于所有达到（联邦）上诉法院级别或更高级别的反托拉斯案件。第六章（i）对第五章的发现进行了概括，并且（ii）以精确的方式描述了需要进一步研究的领域。

著录项

  • 作者

    FRASCO, GREGG PETER.;

  • 作者单位

    Cornell University.;

  • 授予单位 Cornell University.;
  • 学科 Economics General.
  • 学位 Ph.D.
  • 年度 1988
  • 页码 517 p.
  • 总页数 517
  • 原文格式 PDF
  • 正文语种 eng
  • 中图分类 经济学;
  • 关键词

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