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首页> 外文学位 >THE SELECTION OF MACROECONOMIC POLICY CONSTITUTIONS IN THE PRESENCE OF STRUCTURAL CHANGE AND RULE CHANGE COSTS.
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THE SELECTION OF MACROECONOMIC POLICY CONSTITUTIONS IN THE PRESENCE OF STRUCTURAL CHANGE AND RULE CHANGE COSTS.

机译：在存在结构变化和规则变化成本的情况下，宏观经济政策构成的选择。

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摘要

This dissertation examines the choice of policy constitutions when the economic structure can change over time. Starting from a static economic model where the presence of labor distortions causes time consistent discretionary policy to create too much inflation, several alternative constitutions are investigated and their performance is compared. The three basic constitutions studied are: the political/discretionary constitution where electoral competition forces monetary authorities to act as if they are maximizing ex post social welfare; the fixed tenure rule where rules are changed at fixed intervals; and the switching rule where rule changes occur when the social benefits of doing so exceed the social costs.;Besides the three basic constitutions, two extensions are considered. A constitution is examined where the monetary authority can control the agenda. Here social welfare may actually increase when the costs of changing rules increases. Furthermore, a constitution is investigated where political parties have their own policy preferences. Using rational choice by the voters, a partisanship model is constructed where the probability of any particular party winning the election is endogenous. Because wage contracts are set a period in advance, voters by choosing one party over another are implicitly choosing the level of surprise inflation which enhances the effectiveness of stabilization policy.;The nature of structural change is very important to the welfare comparison of the alternative constitutions and to the characteristics of these constitutions. When inflation rate preferences change, society may choose to let the monetary policy be controlled by a politically motivated monetary authority. The politically motivated monetary authority has an incentive to adjust instantaneously to changes in social preferences while the rule constitutions are burdened by adjustment costs. However, when the labor distortion is changing over time, a rule will always be preferred to the political/discretionary constitution and will imply a monetary authority that cares more about inflation than society does.
机译：本文探讨了经济结构可以随着时间变化的政策构成选择。从静态的经济模型开始，在这种模型中，劳动力扭曲的存在会导致时间一致的自由裁量政策造成过多的通货膨胀，因此对几种替代性宪法进行了研究，并对它们的绩效进行了比较。研究的三个基本宪法是：政治/自由裁量宪法，选举竞争迫使货币当局采取行动，好像他们在事后最大化社会福利；固定使用权规则，其中规则以固定间隔更改；以及当规则的改变带来的社会利益超过社会成本时发生规则改变的转换规则。；除了这三个基本构成之外，还考虑了两个扩展。审查宪法，由货币当局控制议程。当改变规则的成本增加时，社会福利实际上可能会增加。此外，对政党有自己的政策偏好的宪法进行了调查。使用选民的理性选择，建立了党派选举模型，其中任何特定政党赢得选举的可能性都是内生的。因为工资合同是提前设定的，所以选民通过选择一方而不是另一方隐含地选择了意外通货膨胀水平，从而提高了稳定政策的有效性。；结构变更的性质对于替代宪法的福利比较非常重要。以及这些宪法的特征。当通货膨胀率偏好改变时，社会可能选择让货币政策由出于政治动机的货币当局控制。具有政治动机的货币当局有动机立即调整以适应社会偏好的变化，而规则宪法则由调整成本负担。但是，当劳动扭曲随着时间而变化时，规则总是比政治/自由裁量制宪法更可取，并且意味着货币当局比社会更关心通货膨胀。

著录项

  • 作者

    BALKE, NATHAN STUART.;

  • 作者单位

    Northwestern University.;

  • 授予单位 Northwestern University.;
  • 学科 Economic theory.
  • 学位 Ph.D.
  • 年度 1986
  • 页码 282 p.
  • 总页数 282
  • 原文格式 PDF
  • 正文语种 eng
  • 中图分类
  • 关键词

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