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ON THE EMPIRICAL CONTENT OF SOME THEORIES OF COGNITIVE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY (DISSONANCE, PHILOSOPHY OF MIND, SCIENCE)

机译：关于认知社会心理学的某些理论（失调，思维哲学，科学）的经验内容

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摘要

This dissertation deals with a conceptual confusion in cognitive social psychology which led to the formulation of influential theories without empirical content. Festinger's theory of cognitive dissonance is used as a case study. I show that cognitive social psychology is grounded in common-sense psychology and, in its scientific theorizing, it co-opts the commonsensical ascription of mental states in explaining behavior. It assumes that persons have beliefs/cognitions and also likes, desires, and miscellaneous affective states. The principal argument of the dissertation is that the technical terms of social psychology, e.g., 'cognition', are dismembered versions of commonsensical concepts, e.g., 'belief'. The concept 'belief' is explicated in order to demonstrate the following points: (1) We are able to interpret the behaviors and utterances of other human beings only on the assumption that we choose to ascribe beliefs, desires, and other mental-state terms to them, and only on the condition that we assume their belief system to be largely true and largely consistent (the principle of charity). (2) In ascribing beliefs to others, we commit ourselves to regarding 'believers' not to be aware of holding inconsistent beliefs, and to assuming that 'believers' will want to remove such inconsistencies when these come to their awareness (the principle of consistency of beliefs).;A reconstruction of Festinger's theory is presented in order to demonstrate its structure. It is argued that Festinger's thesis that dissonance-reduction is a motive is empirically vacuous. His assumptions that his theory needs empirical confirmation and that such confirmation can be provided by social psychology experiments are both false. It is suggested that the long-time standing erroneous belief that Festinger's theory and other theories of cognitive consistency are empirically confirmable scientific theories is the result of a confusion between complex commonsensical concepts and concepts of cognitive social psychology.;Some aspects of common-sense psychology as a theory are discussed. The concept of desire is explicated, and a principle of desire conflict is formulated. It is argued that Festinger's examples of cognitive dissonance are better explained as instances of conflicting desires.
机译：本文的研究涉及认知社会心理学的概念混乱，导致没有经验内容的有影响力理论的形成。 Festinger的认知失调理论被用作案例研究。我证明认知社会心理学是建立在常识心理学基础上的，并且在其科学理论上，它在解释行为时采用了心理状态的常识性归属。它假设人们具有信仰/认知，并且也喜欢，渴望和其他情感状态。论文的主要论点是，社会心理学的技术术语，例如“认知”，是常识性概念（例如“信仰”）的肢解形式。为了阐明以下几点，对“信仰”的概念进行了阐述：（1）仅在我们选择将信仰，欲望和其他精神状态术语归为假设的情况下，我们才能解释其他人的行为和话语。对他们，只有在我们假设他们的信仰体系基本真实且基本一致的情况下（慈善原则）。 （2）在将信仰归于他人时，我们致力于使“信仰者”不要意识到持有不一致的信仰，并假设“信仰者”希望消除此类不一致之处（一致性原则） ）。对费斯廷格的理论进行了重构，以证明其结构。有人认为，费斯廷格关于减少失谐是动机的论点在经验上是虚假的。他的假设认为他的理论需要经验证明，而这种确认可以通过社会心理学实验来提供，这都是错误的。有人认为，长期以来的错误观点认为，费斯廷格的理论和其他认知一致性理论是经验上可以证实的科学理论，这是复杂的常识性概念与认知社会心理学概念之间混淆的结果。；常识心理学的某些方面作为理论进行了讨论。阐述了欲望的概念，阐述了欲望冲突的原理。有人认为，费斯廷格关于认知失调的例子可以更好地解释为欲望冲突的例子。

著录项

  • 作者

    NAQVI, ALI MEHDI.;

  • 作者单位

    University of Michigan.;

  • 授予单位 University of Michigan.;
  • 学科 Social psychology.
  • 学位 Ph.D.
  • 年度 1986
  • 页码 129 p.
  • 总页数 129
  • 原文格式 PDF
  • 正文语种 eng
  • 中图分类
  • 关键词

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