• 主题
高级搜索  >
历史搜索 清空历史
首页> 外文学位 >BIDDING WITH A BUDGET CONSTRAINT (AUCTIONS, NON-COOPERATIVE GAMES, UNCERTAINTY, PRICING, PURE STRATEGIES).
【24h】

BIDDING WITH A BUDGET CONSTRAINT (AUCTIONS, NON-COOPERATIVE GAMES, UNCERTAINTY, PRICING, PURE STRATEGIES).

机译：用预算约束进行竞标（竞价，非合作游戏，不确定性，定价，纯策略）。

获取原文
获取原文并翻译 | 示例
页面导航
  • 摘要
  • 著录项
  • 相似文献
  • 相关主题

摘要

The bidding behavior of players in a perfectly divisible good auction is examined under the assumption that the players are constrained by their capital endowments. The purpose of this paper is to derive and compare the optimal bidding behavior under the rules of the discriminatory price and the competitive price auctioning procedures given this constraint.Because of the possibility of a partial payoff to the low bidder, the optimal price bidding strategy for the discriminatory price auction is everywhere lower than that for the unconstrained first price auction given that the bidders are effectively constrained. When the players are not constrained the two functions are identical. Similarly, the optimal price bidding strategy in the competitive price auction is everywhere lower than that for the unconstrained second price auction but converging to that strategy as the budget increases.From a comparison of the optimal constrained price bidding strategies derived for the discriminatory price and the competitive price auctions we conclude that the mean and variance of the bids are greater under the competitive price procedure. It is also shown that the expected revenue to the seller is greater under the discriminatory price method.The model developed in this paper is applied to the Treasury Auctions and corporate Dutch auctions. From the results of the model it is concluded that the use of the discriminatory price procedure by the Treasury is consistent with expected revenue maximization. The use of the fixed price method and even the Dutch auction in corporate self tender offers is concluded to be inconsistent with cost minimization.In order to address this question the homogeneous rectangular game introduced by Vickrey is generalized by assuming the good to be perfectly divisible and by assuming the bidders to be constrained by their budgets. A Nash equilibrium analysis is employed to determine the optimal bidding strategies for the participants.
机译：在假定球员受到其资本end赋约束的假设下，检验了球员在完全可分割的商品拍卖中的竞价行为。本文的目的是在歧视性价格和竞争性价格拍卖程序的约束条件下推导和比较最优竞价行为。由于存在向低价竞标者部分回报的可能性，因此最优竞价策略鉴于投标人受到有效限制，因此歧视性价格拍卖在任何地方都比无限制的第一次价格拍卖要低。当玩家不受约束时，两个功能是相同的。同样，竞争性价格竞标中的最优价格竞标策略到处都比无约束的第二价格竞标中的最优竞标策略低，但随着预算的增加而收敛到该策略。竞争性价格拍卖我们得出结论，在竞争性价格程序下，投标的均值和方差更大。还表明，在歧视性价格法下，卖方的预期收益更大。本文开发的模型适用于国债拍卖和荷兰公司拍卖。从模型的结果可以得出结论，财政部使用歧视性价格程序与预期收益最大化相一致。结论是使用固定价格方法甚至在公司自投标中进行荷兰式拍卖都与成本最小化不一致。为了解决这个问题，维克瑞提出的同质矩形博弈通过假设商品可以被完美地整除并进行推广。通过假设投标人受其预算约束。纳什均衡分析用于确定参与者的最佳竞标策略。

著录项

  • 作者

    SIMONS, MARILYN HAWRYS.;

  • 作者单位

    State University of New York at Stony Brook.;

  • 授予单位 State University of New York at Stony Brook.;
  • 学科 Economics General.
  • 学位 Ph.D.
  • 年度 1984
  • 页码 231 p.
  • 总页数 231
  • 原文格式 PDF
  • 正文语种 eng
  • 中图分类
  • 关键词

相似文献

  • 外文文献
  • 中文文献
  • 专利
获取原文

客服邮箱：kefu@zhangqiaokeyan.com

京公网安备：11010802029741号 ICP备案号：京ICP备15016152号-6 六维联合信息科技 (北京) 有限公司©版权所有

  • 客服微信

  • 服务号