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首页> 外文学位 >PENSIONS AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING: TOWARDS A NATIONAL POLICY ON RETIREMENT INCOME SUPPORT (MICROECONOMICS, INSURANCE INFORMATION).
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PENSIONS AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING: TOWARDS A NATIONAL POLICY ON RETIREMENT INCOME SUPPORT (MICROECONOMICS, INSURANCE INFORMATION).

机译：养老金和集体谈判：制定关于退休收入支持的国家政策（微观经济学，保险信息）。

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摘要

The ambiguity and flexibility surrounding the cost and value of a pension promise are advantageous to employers and collective bargainers. Firms have superior control over pension finances and plan design, as well as greater awareness of the employment and demographic characteristics of the covered group. This asymmetric power and information, coupled with the tendency of workers to overestimate the value of their pension promises, allows for a gap between labor costs and perceived compensation and great latitude in bargaining.;The theoretical portion of the thesis suggests that pensions are demanded and supplied as insurance; some collect, others don't, but all pay premiums in the form of lower wages. In insurance markets asymmetric information and power cause potential moral hazard and adverse selection. The extent to which adverse selection and moral hazard exist depends upon the asymmetry between an employer's and a worker's estimated value of the defined-benefit pension promise and the ability to vary its worth.;A defined-benefit pension plan is replete with moral hazard because there are so many factors that determine the ultimate value of a pension promisee. Many of the factors are known and controlled solely by the employer. Yet, the process of collective bargaining provides the union with the opportunity to take advantage of the ambiguity and flexibility in pension costs and benefits.;The theoretical and empirical results should help policy makers evaluate the ability of the private sector to supply social insurance. Labor unions may, in the light of this analysis, reconsider their agenda for pension fund investment control and pension benefit improvements. (Abstract shortened with permission of author.);The determinants of worker overvaluation of pension promises are examined using the 1981 President's Commission on Pension Policy's household survey. Firm ability and incentive to manipulate pension funds are documented in theory, by history, by reported cases, and statistically using COMPUSTAT'S data on pension funds and the Securities and Exchange's data on corporate finances. The advantages of pensions to collective bargainers are documented in a case study of pension negotiations between United Stanford Employees, Service Employees International Union, Local 680 and Stanford University.
机译：围绕养老金承诺的成本和价值的模糊性和灵活性对雇主和集体谈判者有利。公司对养老金的财务和计划设计有较高的控制权，并且对所覆盖群体的就业和人口特征有更高的认识。这种不对称的权力和信息，再加上工人倾向于高估其养老金承诺的价值，使得劳动力成本与可感知的薪酬之间存在着差距，并且讨价还价的余地很大。作为保险提供；有些人收取，有些人不收取，但是所有人都以较低的工资形式支付保费。在保险市场中，信息和权力的不对称会导致潜在的道德风险和逆向选择。逆向选择和道德风险的存在程度取决于用人单位和工人的设定受益养老金承诺的估计值和其价值变动能力之间的不对称性。设定受益养老金计划充满道德风险，因为决定养老金承诺者最终价值的因素太多。许多因素是雇主唯一知道和控制的。然而，集体谈判的过程为工会提供了利用养老金成本和福利的模棱两可和灵活性的机会。理论和实证结果应有助于决策者评估私营部门提供社会保险的能力。根据这一分析，工会可以重新考虑其养老金投资控制和养老金改善计划。 （摘要在作者允许下缩短。）；工人对养老金承诺高估的决定因素，是通过1981年总统养老金政策委员会的家庭调查研究的。公司操纵养老基金的能力和动机在理论上，按历史记录，按报告的案例记录，并在统计上使用COMPUSTAT的养老基金数据和证券交易所的公司财务数据进行记录。养老金对集体谈判者的优势已在美国斯坦福大学员工，国际服务雇员工会，Local 680和斯坦福大学之间的养老金谈判案例研究中得到了证明。

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  • 作者

    GHILARDUCCI, M. TERESA.;

  • 作者单位

    University of California, Berkeley.;

  • 授予单位 University of California, Berkeley.;
  • 学科 Economics Labor.
  • 学位 Ph.D.
  • 年度 1984
  • 页码 219 p.
  • 总页数 219
  • 原文格式 PDF
  • 正文语种 eng
  • 中图分类
  • 关键词

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