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Essays on competition in the pharmaceutical industry.

机译：医药行业竞争论文。

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摘要

Chapter 1: Patents and Entry Competition in the Pharmaceutical Industry: The Role of Marketing Exclusivity. Effective patent length for innovation drugs is severely curtailed because of extensive efficacy and safety tests required for FDA approval, raising concern over adequacy of incentives for new drug development. The Hatch-Waxman Act extends patent length for new drugs by five years, but also promotes generic entry by simplifying approval procedures and granting 180-day marketing exclusivity to a first generic entrant before the patent expires. In this paper we present a dynamic model to examine the effect of marketing exclusivity. We find that marketing exclusivity may be redundant and its removal may increase generic firms' profits and social welfare.;Chapter 2: Why Authorized Generics?: Theoretical and Empirical Investigations Facing generic competition, the brand-name companies some-times launch generic versions themselves called authorized generics. This practice is puzzling. If it is cannibalization, it cannot be profitable. If it is divisionalization, it should be practiced always instead of sometimes. I explain this phenomenon in terms of switching costs in a model in which the incumbent first develops a customer base to ready itself against generic competition later. I show that only sufficiently low switching costs or large market size justifies launch of AGs. I then use prescription drug data to test those results and find support.;Chapter 3: The Merger Paradox and R&D Oligopoly theory says that merger is unprofitable, unless a majority of firms in industry merge. Here, we introduce R&D opportunities to resolve this so-called merger paradox. We have three results. First, when there is one R&D firm, that firm can profitably merge with any number of non-R&D firms. Second, with multiple R&D firms and multiple non-R&D firms, all R&D firms can profitably merge. Third, with two R&D firms and two non-R&D firms, each R&D firms prefer to merge with a non-R&D firm. With three or more than non-R&D firms, however, the R&D firms prefer to merge with each other.
机译：第1章：制药行业的专利和进入竞争：市场排他性的作用。由于FDA批准需要进行广泛的功效和安全性测试，因此严重限制了创新药物的有效专利期限，这引起了人们对新药开发激励措施是否足够的担忧。 《哈奇-瓦克斯曼法》（Hatch-Waxman Act）将新药的专利期限延长了五年，但同时也简化了审批程序，并在专利到期之前授予了第一个仿制药进入者180天市场独占权，从而促进了仿制药的进入。在本文中，我们提出了一个动态模型来检验营销专有性的影响。我们发现营销专有权可能是多余的，取消专有权可能会提高仿制药公司的利润和社会福利。第二章：为什么要使用仿制药？：理论研究和实证研究面对仿制药竞争，品牌公司有时会自己推出仿制药称为授权的通用药品。这种做法令人费解。如果是人人同化，就不可能盈利。如果是分割，则应始终实践而不是有时实践。我以转换成本的方式解释了这种现象，在这种模式中，先任者首先建立了客户群，随后为应对通用竞争做好了准备。我表明，只有足够低的转换成本或较大的市场规模才有必要推出AG。然后，我使用处方药数据测试这些结果并寻求支持。;第3章：合并悖论和R＆D寡头垄断理论说，除非行业中的大多数公司合并，合并是无利可图的。在这里，我们介绍了研发机会来解决这种所谓的合并悖论。我们有三个结果。首先，如果有一家研发公司，那么该公司可以与任何数量的非研发公司进行利润合并。其次，拥有多个研发公司和多个非研发公司，所有研发公司都可以从中获利。第三，有两个研发公司和两个非研发公司，每个研发公司都倾向于与一个非研发公司合并。但是，与三个或三个以上非研发公司相比，研发公司更愿意彼此合并。

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  • 作者

    Wan, Jiangyun.;

  • 作者单位

    Florida International University.;

  • 授予单位 Florida International University.;
  • 学科 Economic theory.;Commerce-Business.;Economics.;Pharmaceutical sciences.
  • 学位 Ph.D.
  • 年度 2015
  • 页码 97 p.
  • 总页数 97
  • 原文格式 PDF
  • 正文语种 eng
  • 中图分类
  • 关键词

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