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Modeling Internet Service Provider (ISP) Tier Design and Impact of Data Caps.

机译：建模Internet服务提供商（ISP）层设计和数据上限的影响。

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摘要

In this dissertation, we focus on the design of tiered pricing plans offered by Internet Service Providers (ISPs). We also analyze the impact of data caps on the pricing plans, users, ISP profits and social welfare, by considering ISP monopoly and ISP duopoly, respectively.;The initial work is about modeling ISP service tier design without data caps. Web browsing and video streaming are considered as the two dominant Internet applications. We propose a novel set of utility functions that depend on a user's willingness to pay for each application, the performance of each application, and the time devoted to each application. For a monopoly provider, the demand function for each tier is derived as a function of tier price and performance. We first give conditions for the tier rates, tier prices, and network capacity that maximize Internet Service Provider profit, defined as subscription revenue minus capacity cost. We then show how an Internet Service Provider may simplify tier and capacity design, by allowing their engineering department to set network capacity, their marketing department to set tier prices, and both to jointly set tier rates.;The next work is focused on how ISPs choose data caps and the resulting impact on users. We propose a data cap model by extending the ISP tier design model. A monopoly ISP is presumed to maximize its profit by controlling tier prices, tier rates, data caps and overage charges. We show how users fall into five categories: non-Internet subscribers, basic tier subscribers, premium tier subscribers unaffected by a data cap, premium tier subscribers who are capped but do not choose to exceed the cap, and premium tier subscribers who exceed the cap and pay overage charges. When data caps are used for profit maximization, we find that the monopoly ISP has the incentive to keep the basic tier price and basic tier rate unchanged, to increase the premium tier rate, and to reduce the premium tier price. The ISP also has the incentive to set smaller caps and higher overage charges than when caps are used only to ensure that heavy users pay for their usage.;Finally, we analyze the impact of data caps on ISP duopoly competition. In the duopoly competition model, users seek to maximize their surplus by making their ISP subscription choices and by controlling the time devoted to Internet activities. ISPs seek to maximize their profits by competing through their tier prices, tier rates, network capacities, data caps and overage charges. We illustrate how users' utilities are affected by data caps, and the resulting impact upon ISP market shares. We show that both ISPs have an incentive to use data caps and overage charges to ensure that heavy users pay at least an amount equal to the cost of their usage. The initial incentives for both ISPs to update their tier prices and tier rates given the newly added data caps are also predicted under different scenarios. The final Nash equilibrium with data caps for profit maximization is analyzed through simulation, and compared to the Nash equilibrium without data caps. The corresponding changes in ISP profits, user subscription choices, and user surpluses are illustrated.
机译：本文主要研究互联网服务提供商（ISP）提供的分层定价计划。我们还分别通过考虑ISP的垄断和ISP的双重垄断来分析数据上限对定价计划，用户，ISP利润和社会福利的影响。初始工作是对没有数据上限的ISP服务层设计进行建模。 Web浏览和视频流被认为是两个主要的Internet应用程序。我们提出了一套新颖的实用程序功能，这些功能取决于用户为每个应用程序付款的意愿，每个应用程序的性能以及为每个应用程序花费的时间。对于垄断提供者，每一层的需求函数是根据层价格和性能得出的。我们首先给出使互联网服务提供商的利润最大化的等级费率，等级价格和网络容量的条件，定义为订阅收入减去容量成本。然后，我们展示了Internet服务提供商如何通过允许其工程部门设置网络容量，其营销部门设置层级价格以及双方共同设置层级费率来简化层级和容量设计。;下一个工作重点是ISP如何选择数据上限及其对用户的影响。我们通过扩展ISP层设计模型来提出数据上限模型。假定垄断ISP通过控制等级价格，等级费率，数据上限和超额收费来最大程度地提高利润。我们将展示用户如何分为五类：非互联网订户，基本层订户，不受数据上限影响的高级层订户，有上限但不选择超过上限的高级层订户以及超过上限的高级层订户并支付超额费用。当使用数据上限来实现利润最大化时，我们发现垄断ISP有动机保持基本等级价格和基本等级费率不变，提高溢价等级费率并降低溢价价格。与仅使用上限来确保重度用户支付使用费时相比，ISP还具有设置较小的上限和较高的超额收费的动机。最后，我们分析了数据上限对ISP双寡头竞争的影响。在双头竞争模型中，用户通过选择ISP订阅并控制互联网活动的时间来寻求最大化其盈余。 ISP试图通过竞争其等级价格，等级费率，网络容量，数据上限和超额收费来实现利润最大化。我们说明了用户的公用事业如何受到数据上限的影响，以及由此对ISP市场份额的影响。我们表明，两家ISP都有使用数据上限和超额收费的动机，以确保重度用户至少支付等于其使用成本的金额。鉴于新添加的数据上限，也预计在不同情况下，两家ISP都会更新其等级价格和等级费率的最初诱因。通过仿真分析了具有数据上限以实现利润最大化的最终Nash平衡，并将其与没有数据上限的Nash平衡进行了比较。说明了ISP利润，用户订阅选择和用户剩余的相应变化。

著录项

  • 作者

    Dai, Wei.;

  • 作者单位

    University of California, Irvine.;

  • 授予单位 University of California, Irvine.;
  • 学科 Computer science.;Economics.;Electrical engineering.
  • 学位 Ph.D.
  • 年度 2015
  • 页码 197 p.
  • 总页数 197
  • 原文格式 PDF
  • 正文语种 eng
  • 中图分类
  • 关键词

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