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Hardware Trojans in Wireless Cryptographic ICs

机译:无线加密IC中的硬件木马

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摘要

Over the last decade, the problem of hardware Trojans in manufactured integrated circuits (ICs) has been a topic of intense investigation by academic researchers and governmental entities. Hardware Trojans are malicious modifications introduced in a manufactured IC, which can be exploited by a knowledgeable adversary to cause incorrect results, steal sensitive data, or even incapacitate a chip. Given the sensitive nature of applications wherein hardware Trojan-infested ICs may be deployed, developing detection methodologies has become paramount. Indeed, traditional test methods fall short in revealing hardware Trojans, as they are geared towards identifying modeled defects and, therefore, cannot reveal unmodeled malicious inclusions.;Various hardware Trojan detection methods have been proposed, most of them targeted digital circuits. As pointed out therein, the Analog/RF domain is an attractive attack target, since the wireless communication of these chips with the environment over public channels simplifies the process of staging an attack without obtaining physical access to the I/O of the chip. On the other hand, signals in an Analog/RF IC are continuous and highly-correlated to one another; hence, the likelihood of a modification disturbing these correlations is very high. Therefore, this dissertation outlines the problems and proposes three solutions to ensure trustworthiness of Analog/RF ICs: namely, i) Utilize statistical side channel fingerprinting to detect hardware Trojan in Analog/RF ICs. ii) Propose to use a combination of a trusted simulation model, measurements from process control monitors (PCMs), that are typically present either on die or on wafer kerf, and advanced statistical tail modeling techniques to detect hardware Trojan without relying on golden chips. iii) Introduce a concurrent hardware Trojan detection (CHTD) methodology for wireless cryptographic integrated circuits (ICs), based on continuous extraction of a side-channel fingerprint and evaluation by a trained on-chip neural classifier. All methods proposed in this dissertation have been verified with measurements from actual silicon chips.
机译:在过去的十年中,制造集成电路(IC)中的硬件木马问题一直是学术研究人员和政府机构广泛研究的话题。硬件木马是在制造的IC中引入的恶意修改,可以被知识渊博的对手利用,从而导致错误结果,窃取敏感数据甚至使芯片瘫痪。考虑到其中可能部署受硬件特洛伊木马侵扰的IC的应用程序的敏感性质,开发检测方法已变得至关重要。确实,传统的测试方法无法揭示硬件特洛伊木马,因为它们旨在识别已建模的缺陷,因此无法发现未建模的恶意夹杂物。;已经提出了各种硬件特洛伊木马检测方法,其中大多数针对数字电路。如其中所指出的,模拟/ RF域是有吸引力的攻击目标,因为这些芯片与环境通过公共信道的无线通信简化了进行攻击的过程,而没有获得对芯片的I / O的物理访问。另一方面,模拟/ RF IC中的信号是连续的并且彼此高度相关。因此,修改干扰这些相关性的可能性非常高。因此,本文概述了这些问题,并提出了三种解决方案以确保模拟/ RF IC的可信赖性:即:i)利用统计侧通道指纹检测模拟/ RF IC中的硬件木马。 ii)建议结合使用可信的仿真模型,过程控制监视器(PCM)的测量结果(通常存在于管芯或晶片切口上)以及先进的统计尾部建模技术来检测硬件特洛伊木马程序,而无需依赖金芯片。 iii)基于连续提取侧通道指纹并由经过训练的片上神经分类器进行评估,介绍了用于无线密码集成电路(IC)的并发硬件Trojan检测(CHTD)方法。本文提出的所有方法均已通过实际硅芯片的测量得到验证。

著录项

  • 作者

    Liu, Yu.;

  • 作者单位

    The University of Texas at Dallas.;

  • 授予单位 The University of Texas at Dallas.;
  • 学科 Electrical engineering.
  • 学位 Ph.D.
  • 年度 2017
  • 页码 118 p.
  • 总页数 118
  • 原文格式 PDF
  • 正文语种 eng
  • 中图分类 康复医学;
  • 关键词

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