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Brings the politics back in: Political incentive and policy distortion in China.

机译：重回政治：中国的政治动机和政策扭曲。

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摘要

This dissertation explores why some commendable policy goals set by the central government of China have been left unmet at the local levels. Observing the significance of policy behaviors of local officials in producing policy outcomes in their jurisdictions, it attributes the apparent policy distortion to the "incorrect" incentives that local officials face now. Different from those focusing on the new economic incentive offered by the new decentralization arrangement during the reform era, this study looks into the nature of political incentives embedded in the old top-down cadre management system to see how local officials are "incentivized" politically to produce distorted policy outcomes.;By investigating formal rules governing local chiefs' turnovers and actual past turnovers of the prefectural chiefs in Zhejiang and Hubei provinces during the reform era, this study finds out that the top-down political incentive is unbalanced by nature in that promotion criteria for local chiefs slant heavily to local chiefs' achievements (zhengji) in promoting local economic growth while their performance in other policy issues are neglected at large. It argues that such unbalanced nature of top-down political incentive has induced local officials to divert more efforts to pursue "mindless" economic growth at the cost of other commendable goals; policy distortion therefore emerges as the consequence of unbalanced political incentive.;This dissertation continues to explain why the apparent policy distortion has persisted. By investigating five cases illustrating the way the center deals with local policy distortion, it argues that the central government is unwilling, unable and ineffective to sanction policy distortion because of the innate conflict between the indirect management tool the center uses and the multiple governance goals it desires for. The unbalanced nature of current top-down political incentive is therefore predetermined and policy distortion persists.;This dissertation contributes to the general discussion on central-local dynamics in China by bringing back the top-down political incentives as the most important institutional cause for policy outcome. Policy implication of this study is clear: the problem of policy distortion could not be solved without reshuffling the top-down political incentive system.
机译：本文探讨了为什么中央政府设定的一些值得称赞的政策目标在地方一级未能实现。观察到地方官员的政策行为在其辖区内产生政策成果的重要性，将表面上的政策扭曲归因于地方官员现在面临的“不正确”激励措施。与研究改革时期新的权力下放安排所提供的新的经济激励措施不同，本研究调查了自上而下的干部管理体制中所包含的政治激励措施的性质，以了解地方官员如何通过政治手段“激励”工人。产生扭曲的政策结果。；通过调查改革时期浙江和湖北省地方行政首长的变动和县长的实际过往变动的正式规则，本研究发现自上而下的政治动机在本质上是不平衡的地方首长的晋升标准严重影响了地方首长在促进地方经济增长方面的成就（正机），而他们在其他政策问题上的表现却被普遍忽略。它认为，自上而下的政治激励机制的这种不平衡性质促使地方官员转移了更多努力，以牺牲其他值得赞扬的目标为代价来追求“无意识的”经济增长；因此，政策扭曲是由于政治动机不平衡而产生的。；本论文继续解释了为什么表面上的政策扭曲仍然存在。通过调查五个案例，说明该中心处理本地政策失真的方式，它认为，由于该中心使用的间接管理工具与其多重治理目标之间存在先天的冲突，中央政府不愿意，无法且无效率地制裁政策失真。渴望。因此，当前的自上而下的政治激励机制的不平衡性质是预先确定的，并且政策扭曲仍然存在。结果。这项研究的政策含义很明显：如果不重新调整自上而下的政治激励制度，就无法解决政策扭曲的问题。

著录项

  • 作者

    Mei, Ciqi.;

  • 作者单位

    University of Maryland, College Park.;

  • 授予单位 University of Maryland, College Park.;
  • 学科 Political Science General.;Political Science Public Administration.
  • 学位 Ph.D.
  • 年度 2009
  • 页码 218 p.
  • 总页数 218
  • 原文格式 PDF
  • 正文语种 eng
  • 中图分类
  • 关键词

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