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Essays on residential investment and social insurance.

机译：住宅投资和社会保险论文。

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摘要

My Thesis consists of two chapters on quantitative macroeconomics. The first chapter analyzes the dynamics of residential investment in the United States. In U.S. business cycles, residential investment differs from consumption and business investment in two respects. First, residential investment leads GDP while business investment lags and consumption coincides with GDP. Second, residential investment is more volatile than consumption and business investment. The literature attempts to account for these two features, but does so with limited success. This paper is an attempt to account for these two features of residential investment dynamics. To do this, I make two distinctive assumptions. First, agents face collateral constraints. Second, agents receive a signal about TFP one period in advance. In a partial equilibrium analysis where interest rates are fixed, when agents receive positive signals, they want to increase current consumption, including housing consumption, to inter-temporally smooth consumption. Agents will purchase housing more than other consumption goods because they are bound by collateral constraints. In a general equilibrium analysis where interest rates are endogenous, in the event of good news, residential investment still leads consumption and GDP, despite the expectation of a higher rate of return on business capital. This occurs because poor agents borrow more and purchase more housing. Savings from wealthy agents are used to finance this increased borrowing. This process leads to a reallocation from business investment to residential investment. Through these mechanisms, the model can generate the lead-lag relationship observed in data and the relatively high volatility of residential investment.;The second chapter analyzes the social insurance programs of developing countries by studying the interaction between insurance programs and limited commitment in financial contracts. I set up a model economy where the limited enforcement of contracts leads to the result that the reduction in idiosyncratic risks effected by a social insurance program leads to a decrease in output and welfare. This happens because the provision of more insurance generates lower idiosyncratic risks and therefore reduces aggregate saving. In general equilibrium, this leads to a higher interest rate. The increase in interest rate deteriorates contract enforcement by giving entrepreneurs a stronger incentive to default the financial contract with financial intermediaries. This conclusion is consistent with the fact that countries with weaker contract enforceability tend to have smaller social insurance program relative to their GDP.
机译：我的论文包括关于定量宏观经济学的两章。第一章分析了美国住宅投资的动态。在美国的商业周期中，住宅投资在两个方面不同于消费和商业投资。首先，住宅投资领先于GDP，而商业投资滞后，消费与GDP一致。其次，住宅投资比消费和商业投资更不稳定。文献试图解释这两个特征，但是这样做的成功有限。本文试图解释住宅投资动态的这两个特征。为此，我做出两个不同的假设。首先，代理商面临附带约束。其次，座席提前一个周期收到有关TFP的信号。在固定利率的部分均衡分析中，当特工收到积极信号时，他们希望增加当前的消费（包括住房消费），以期暂时平缓消费。代理商会比其他消费品购买更多的住房，因为它们受到附带约束的约束。在利率为内生性的一般均衡分析中，在出现好消息的情况下，尽管期望获得更高的商业资本回报率，但住宅投资仍将主导消费和GDP。发生这种情况是因为贫穷的经纪人借了更多钱并购买了更多住房。富裕经纪人的积蓄被用来为增加的借贷提供资金。这个过程导致从商业投资到住宅投资的重新分配。通过这些机制，该模型可以生成数据中观察到的超前-滞后关系以及居民投资的较高波动性。 。我建立了一个模型经济，在这种经济中，合同的有限执行导致了结果，即社会保险计划所带来的特殊风险的减少导致了产出和福利的减少。发生这种情况是因为提供更多的保险产生了较低的特质风险，因此减少了总储蓄。在一般均衡中，这导致较高的利率。利率的上升通过给予企业家更强的动机来违约与金融中介机构的金融合同，从而恶化了合同的执行。这一结论与以下事实相吻合：合同执行力较弱的国家相对于其GDP倾向于拥有较小的社会保险计划。

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  • 作者

    Yuan, Yufei.;

  • 作者单位

    The University of Western Ontario (Canada).;

  • 授予单位 The University of Western Ontario (Canada).;
  • 学科 Economics General.;Economics Finance.;Economics Theory.
  • 学位 Ph.D.
  • 年度 2009
  • 页码 83 p.
  • 总页数 83
  • 原文格式 PDF
  • 正文语种 eng
  • 中图分类 经济学;经济学;财政、金融;
  • 关键词

  • 入库时间 2022-08-17 11:38:25

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