In my dissertation, I investigate the development of the ethical theory of emotions in two ancient Chinese Confucian texts, Lunyu (the Analects of Confucius) and Mengziˇ (Mencius). Departing from much of the previous scholarship on ancient Chinese emotion, which has exclusively focused on the single Chinese term 'qing' ("emotion"), I closely analyze a number of Chinese terms for particular emotions in the textual and historical contexts of Lunyu and Mengziˇ. The leading question of my dissertation is what role emotions (especially good emotions such as compassion) play in moral judgment, moral motivation, and moral cultivation for Confucius (551--479 B.C.E.) and Mencius (390--305 B.C.E.), and against the dominant theoretical positions in recent work on Chinese philosophy I argue that in the Mencius, (1) moral emotions provide an important but only partial basis for all-things-considered ethical judgment; (2) not only is the virtuous person in full control of his own desires, but his moral autonomy is not compromised even by his moral emotions; and (3) Mencius' theory of emotional cultivation is significantly based on the inculcation of social values which are not originally embodied in moral emotions.
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