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The economics of large scale infrastructure project finance: An empirical examination of the propensity to project finance.

机译：大型基础设施项目融资的经济学：对项目融资倾向的实证研究。

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摘要

This dissertation empirically examines a financing and governance structure called Project Finance that typically funds large scale, capital intensive, infrastructure investments in risky countries. Separate incorporation by investing firms (sponsors), long term detailed contracts between suppliers and buyers, vertical integration, high debt levels and non-recourse lending characterizes project finance. Project finance finances tangible, decaying assets with low growth options that do not require strong managerial skills. UK's North Sea oil fields, Ras Laffan gas company in Qatar, and Chad Cameroon pipeline are examples of project financed transactions. Lenders achieve a high degree of transparency for project financed transactions due to the non-recourse nature of the debt which also entails higher setting up costs and cost of debt compared to corporate finance. Theoretical research hypothesizes that project finance solves the problem of potentially opportunistic concentrated suppliers/buyers facing large sunk investments in risky countries. Theory also hypothesizes that project finance mitigates underinvestment resulting from conflict between debt and equity holders within a firm. The dissertation compares project financed and corporate financed transactions in the oil, gas and petrochemical industry to test these hypotheses. I compile a dataset of over 400 investments by 340 firms in 74 countries over 17 years to test these two theories. I find that the propensity of firms to use project finance is high and statistically significant when large sunk investments have concentrated buyers/suppliers in risky countries. The propensity for project finance is high when debt coverage ratios are low after controlling for leverage and the volatility of the debt coverage ratios but weakly so. Project finance therefore fulfills the role of a self regulating contract that reduces transaction costs.
机译：本文从经验上考察了一种称为项目融资的融资和治理结构，该项目通常为风险国家的大规模，资本密集型基础设施投资提供资金。投资公司（赞助商）的单独注册，供应商与买方之间的长期详细合同，垂直整合，高债务水平和无追索权贷款是项目融资的特征。项目融资为具有低增长选项且不需要强大管理技能的有形，腐烂资产提供资金。英国北海油田，卡塔尔的拉斯拉凡天然气公司和乍得喀麦隆的管道就是项目融资交易的例子。由于债务的无追索权性质，贷款人在项目融资交易中实现了高度透明，与公司融资相比，还需要更高的设立成本和债务成本。理论研究假设，项目融资解决了潜在的机会集中的供应商/购买者在风险国家面临大量沉没投资的问题。理论还假设，项目融资可以减轻由于公司内部债务与股权持有人之间的冲突而导致的投资不足。本文比较了石油，天然气和石化行业中项目融资和公司融资的交易，以检验这些假设。我汇总了74个国家/地区的340家公司17年间的400多项投资的数据集，以检验这两种理论。我发现，当大量沉没投资将买方/供应商集中在风险国家时，公司使用项目融资的倾向就很高，并且具有统计意义。在控制杠杆率和债务覆盖率的波动性之后，如果债务覆盖率较低，则项目融资的倾向较高，但这种情况较弱。因此，项目融资起着自我调节合同的作用，可以降低交易成本。

著录项

  • 作者

    Sawant, Rajeev Janardan.;

  • 作者单位

    Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy (Tufts University).;

  • 授予单位 Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy (Tufts University).;
  • 学科 Business Administration Management.
  • 学位 Ph.D.
  • 年度 2008
  • 页码 139 p.
  • 总页数 139
  • 原文格式 PDF
  • 正文语种 eng
  • 中图分类
  • 关键词

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