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What Counts as Desiring the Actual Good?

机译：什么才是需要实际的商品？

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摘要

Here is a simple observation about moral character: Moral virtue apparently consists, at least in large part, in caring about the right things. When we imagine a virtuous agent, we find that she cares about particular considerations, and that her caring is at least part of what makes her virtuous. One cannot be fully virtuous, for example, unless one cares at least somewhat about the welfare of others. Here is a corollary: At least sometimes, agents are morally vicious because they do not care about the right things. An agent who just doesn't care whether others live or die should, for example, strike us as severely vicious.;And here, from Hume, is a simple observation about moral responsibility: In order for an agent to be blameworthy or praiseworthy for an action, that action must reflect something about that agent. This observation, too, is supported by common intuitions. Agents seem to be blameworthy when and because their actions reflect something bad about their moral character, and they seem praiseworthy when and because their actions reflect something good about their moral character. And we are generally reluctant to attribute blameworthiness in cases in which circumstances prevent an agent's character from being reflected in his actions---we typically excuse agents whose bad actions result from delusions or uncontrollable impulses, for example.;Here, finally, is an appealing synthesis of these observations. Agents are blameworthy for actions that reflect their moral vices, and moral vices consist, at least in large part, in having the wrong attitudes towards certain considerations. Therefore, it seems that agents are blameworthy when their actions reflect such attitudes. And, since virtues consist, at least in large part, in having the right attitudes towards certain considerations, agents will be praiseworthy for actions that reflect these attitudes. This synthesis is also intuitively plausible. An agent who stands idly by and watches a child drown seems not only vicious in virtue of his indifference to human life, but blameworthy in virtue of the fact that this indifference is reflected in his action. And an agent who makes significant sacrifices to help others is not only virtuous in virtue of her great concern for others, but also praiseworthy when she exercises her virtue.;The preceding observations raise two obvious questions: Which considerations are relevant to virtue and moral worth, and which attitudes are the "appropriate" ones to have towards these considerations? A recently-influential family of views (Arpaly 2002, 2003, 2006; Markovits 2010, 2012, Arpaly and Schroeder 2014a) offers a procedure for answering these questions. The considerations relevant to virtue and moral worth, according to these views, are the considerations that the correct normative theory identifies as relevant to determining the deontic status of an action, and the appropriate attitude towards a particular consideration is determined by that consideration's role as right-making or wrong-making. Thus, a virtuous agent will have positive or pro- attitudes towards those considerations that make actions good or right, and negative or anti- attitudes towards those considerations that make actions bad or wrong. Call accounts of this kind actual good (AG) accounts. A number of considerations count in favor of AG accounts. As noted, they do an excellent job of accommodating several intuitively plausible observations about character and moral worth. They are also equipped to provide intuitively plausible attributions of moral worth in a range of important cases.;But there are additional desiderata for an account of virtue and moral worth. Attributions of moral worth are not merely of theoretical interest but also of practical importance, as they are likely to have implications for which agents we should reward or punish. And while the correct attributions of virtue and moral worth seem to be obvious in some cases, they are not obvious in others. In particular, there are a number of socially, legally, and morally important cases of wrongdoing in which it is not intuitively clear how we should evaluate the agents in question. These include the case of the psychopath; they also include cases of ideologically-motivated agents who act badly as the result of false moral beliefs. Preferably, our account of virtue and moral worth would be useful in guiding our judgments of moral worth in these difficult, real-world cases. Ideally, it would be complete, in the sense that it would offer a generalized procedure for assessing moral worth in all cases: Our account would take the correct normative theory as an input, along with the attitudes reflected in an agent's action, and then act as a function that outputs an unambiguous judgment of moral worth. (Abstract shortened by ProQuest.).
机译：这是关于道德品格的简单观察：道德美德至少在很大程度上包括对正确事物的关心。当我们想象一个贤惠的代理人时，我们发现她在乎特殊的考虑，而她的关心至少是使她成为贤惠的一部分。例如，除非一个人至少在乎他人的福利，否则一个人就不可能完全有德行。这是必然的结果：至少在某些情况下，特工在道德上是恶毒的，因为他们不在乎正确的事情。例如，一个不在乎他人是否活着或死去的代理人，应该以严重的恶行来打击我们。在休H，这是关于道德责任的简单观察：为了使代理人值得谴责或称赞一个动作，该动作必须反映有关该代理的某些信息。普遍的直觉也支持这种观察。代理人似乎在当且因他们的行为反映出他们的道德品格不好而受到谴责，而他们在当且因他们的行为反映出其道德品格的某些善意而受到称赞。在情况阻止代理人的品格反映在他的行为中的情况下，我们通常不愿意将责任归咎于他们-例如，我们通常会为那些行为不当是由于妄想或无法控制的冲动而做出的代理人辩解;最后，这是一个这些观察结果具有吸引力。代理人应该为反映其道德恶行的行为负责，而道德恶行至少在很大程度上包括对某些考虑因素的错误态度。因此，当代理人的行为反映出这种态度时，他们应该受到指责。而且，由于美德至少在很大程度上在于对某些考虑采取正确的态度，因此代理人对于反映这些态度的行为将是值得称赞的。这种综合在直观上也是合理的。一个坐着无所事事并注视着一个孩子被淹死的特工，不仅因为对人的生活漠不关心而恶毒，而且由于这种漠不关心反映在他的行为上而受到谴责。做出重大牺牲来帮助他人的行为人，不仅因为她对他人的关心而贤惠，而且在行使自己的美德时也值得称赞。前面的观察提出了两个明显的问题：哪些考虑与美德和道德价值有关？ ，对于这些考虑，“适当”的态度是什么？最近具有影响力的一系列观点（Arpaly 2002、2003、2006； Markovits 2010、2012，Arpaly和Schroeder 2014a）提供了回答这些问题的程序。根据这些观点，与美德和道德价值相关的考虑是正确的规范理论将其确定为与确定行为的宗法地位相关的考虑，而对特定考虑的适当态度则取决于该考虑的正确作用。 -做错事。因此，一个善良的代理人对那些使行为成为好还是对的考虑具有积极或态度，对那些使行为成败或对错的考虑具有消极或反态度。这类实际商品（AG）的客户账户。有许多考虑因素有利于AG帐户。如前所述，他们出色地完成了关于性格和道德价值的若干直观上合理的观察。它们还具有在一系列重要情况下提供直观的，合理的道德价值归属的能力。但是，对于美德和道德价值的解释，还有其他需求。道德价值归因不仅具有理论意义，而且具有实际重要性，因为它们可能会影响我们应该奖励或惩罚的行为者。尽管在某些情况下美德和道德价值的正确归因似乎很明显，但在另一些情况下却不明显。特别是，存在许多在社会，法律和道德上有不道德行为的重要案例，在这些案例中，直觉上不清楚我们应该如何评估所讨论的代理人。这些包括精神病患者的情况；它们还包括由于错误的道德信念而行为不良的思想动机特工的案例。最好，在这些困难的现实情况下，我们对美德和道德价值的解释将有助于指导我们对道德价值的判断。理想情况下，它是完整的，从某种意义上说，它将提供一种在所有情况下评估道德价值的通用程序：我们的说明将采用正确的规范理论作为输入，以及代理人的行为所反映的态度，然后采取行动作为输出对道德价值的明确判断的功能。 （摘要由ProQuest缩短。）。

著录项

  • 作者

    Clancy, Sean.;

  • 作者单位

    Syracuse University.;

  • 授予单位 Syracuse University.;
  • 学科 Philosophy.;Ethics.
  • 学位 Ph.D.
  • 年度 2017
  • 页码 173 p.
  • 总页数 173
  • 原文格式 PDF
  • 正文语种 eng
  • 中图分类
  • 关键词

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