previous studies focused on the game selection in the political tournament race for the local officials based on the background of China’s administrative decentralization and fiscal contracting. Few articles discussed the effect of the change of local key officials on the local economy vibration. This paper analyzes the policy-selection behaviors for the local officials, as their selection can bring them some “political benefits”and results in some“face project”,it will damn the local economy. This is a special direction to analyze the local economy vibration. This paper also does an empirical study based on an case of Langzhong city of Sichuan Province.%现有较多的文献讨论了行政性分权和财政包干下地方官员为政治晋升锦标赛而进行的一些博弈选择，较少讨论地方政府官员的变更对地方经济振荡的影响。分析了地方政府关键官员在变更后政策选择行为，由于地方政府官员选择短期内能带来政治收益和相关“政绩”工程，可能对本地方的经济造成较大振荡，这也从一个独特角度分析了地方经济振荡的原因。
展开▼
