When confronted with different financing strategies, China’s listed companies have strongly preference to equity financing rather than the financing order that optimal financing theory put forward. To solve this problem, this paper explored the deep reasons in internal and capital market environment for listed companies, through the perspectives of cost for equity financing, windows of opportunity, cost of adverse selection, cost of internal agent, the function of capital market and the defect of laws and regulations related. Finally we come to the conclusion that the reason for equity financing preference is as follows:Through this way, the original stockholders can maximize their fortune and minimize the lost of right of control by despoiling the fortune of new stockholders, owning to the special financing environment in China. However, such preference for equity financing will do harm to the healthy growth of enterprises and stock market. Therefore, we gave several suggestions aiming to solve this puzzle.%针对中国的上市公司在选择融资方式时，首选的是股权融资而非按照经典的融资优序理论的融资顺序这一问题，分别从企业内部及资本市场环境两个大的方面论述了企业股权融资偏好的原因，通过股权融资成本、机会窗口、逆向选择成本、内部代理成本及我国资本市场的根本作用和相关法规的不完善等角度加以说明。最后得出企业偏好股权融资的原因是在中国特定的融资环境中，企业采取股权融资可以使得原股东收益最大化，控制权损失最小化，并夺取了新股东的财富。而这种对股权融资的偏好不仅不利于企业的健康发展，也会对股市的健康发展及发挥融资平台的作用造成很大的损害，提出了相应的建议来解决这一融资怪像。
展开▼
