OBJECTIVE:To provide theoretic reference for management tool used by government effectively to promote the willing of pharmaceutical enterprise about independent innovation.METHODS:Based on literature review,the management tools of the government in enterprises innovation were analyzed.The evolutionary game theory model had been established to analyze results of game playing of enterprise innovation.The reasons for the willing of pharmaceutical enterprise about independent innovation were studied to put forward relevant countermeasures.RESULTS & CONCLUSIONS:Influenced by innovation revenue,innovation cost,imitation revenue and imitation cost,the pharmaceutical enterprises game has several situations:all the pharmaceutical enterprises adopt innovation strategy; all the pharmaceutical enterprises adopt imitation strategy; part of the enterprises adopt irmoration or imitation strategy; the enterprises give up the development of new product.According to different evolutions,the government should adopt different strategies:maintain the situation of policies; support innovation and increase imitation cost; guarantee long-term management countermeasure; adopt measure to ensure that innovation income is higher than cost.%目的:为政府有效运用管理工具、提高制药企业自主创新意愿提供理论借鉴.方法:采用文献研究方法,分析政府在企业创新管理中的政策工具,然后建立企业-企业演化博弈模型,采用演化博弈分析企业创新博弈的结果,同时找出企业自主创新意愿不足的原因,提出相关对策.结果与结论:受创新成本、收益和模仿成本、收益的影响,企业创新博弈可能出现4种不同演化情形:可能所有企业均采取创新或模仿策略,也可能部分企业采取创新策略、部分企业采取模仿策略,或者企业放弃开发新产品.针对不同的演化情形,政府应该采取相应的对策:维持政策现状;从支持创新和增加模仿成本两个方面入手;保证管理对策的长期性;采取措施保证创新收益大于创新成本.
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