运用深沪两市2006-2016年A股企业数据,通过探讨银行债权治理、公司内部治理与管理层代理成本的关系,考察在抑制代理成本的公司治理机制中,银行债权治理作为一种重要的外部治理机制与公司内部治理之间的互动关系,验证内外部治理机制的良性互动对于降低代理成本的有效性.结果发现,管理层激励机制不能降低代理成本,而银行债权机制、董事会机制以及大股东机制均能有效降低代理成本.在降低代理成本的作用机制中,银行债权机制与上述内部治理机制具有显著正向互动关系,对抑制代理成本发挥了协同效应.并且随着时间的推移,银行债权、董事会治理与大股东治理对代理成本的公司治理效应在不断优化,而管理层激励机制的公司治理效应有改善的迹象.%Selecting the data on A-share listed companies during 2006 to 2016, this paper examines the relationship between bank claims as an important external governance mechanism and internal governance mechanism that inhibits agency costs,which may verify the effectiveness of reducing agency costs by the benign interaction between internal and external governance mechanism. esults show that the mechanism of managerial incentive cannot reduce agency costs, while the bank claims, governance and big shareholder governance mechanism can effectively reduce agency costs. Furthermore, in the corporate governance effect mechanism, bank claims has a significant positive interaction with board governance and big shareholder governance, both of which promotes each other, and have synergistic effect on curbingagency costs. And in recent years, the corporate governance effect of bank claims, board governance and big shareholder governance on agency cost is continuously optimized, the effect of managerial incentive on agency costs show a gradual improvement trend.
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