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战略联盟竞合行为的随机突变分析与仿真

         

摘要

The evolution process of partners' strategies in strategic alliances with multi-firm was considered by evolutionary game theory perspective. A deterministic dynamical equation is developed, based on which, the Gaussian White noise is introduced to show the disturbance, and a stochastic dynamical equation is created. The catastrophe of strategic alliances that ranges cooperation to betrayal in the process is analyzed by means of stochastic catastrophe theory. The catastrophe set of control variables is found to explain and forecast the catastrophe of strategic alliances. To validate the correctness of the model, some numerical simulations are given in different scenarios, and it is evident from the illustrations that the behavior of the strategic alliances encounters catastrophe near the catastrophe set.%针对多成员战略联盟在不确定环境下策略的演化过程,借助演化博弈论建立了含有白噪声的随机动力学.利用随机突变理论来分析在不确定性条件下,联盟成员行为(竞争或合作)随着参数的连续变化在整体上发生突变的问题,给出了联盟发生突变的临界集,以此来解释和预测在不确定性环境下,战略联盟发生非计划性解体或者合作失败的突发性问题.对不同场景下的模型进行了数值仿真,结果表明,在临界集附近,联盟集体的行为发生了突变.

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