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捐赠行为、政府干预与代理效率

         

摘要

本文分析了公司捐赠行为对代理效率的作用机理,发现捐赠支出越多越能缓解现金流用于管理者利己效用支出,代理效率越高、政府干预越少则市场化进程更高、代理效率越高;比较而言,政府干预少的地区企业捐赠支出更能提高代理效率,衰退期行业中同样的捐赠支出提升代理效率的功效有限;规模较小组中捐赠行为更容易被市场识别,规模较大组中捐赠行为更多地被视为一种社会责任。因此,捐赠支出有助于缓解自由现金流代理成本,有助于公司代理效率的改善;现实中捐赠减少现金流的同时提高了公司的代理效率和声誉,利于当前或未来公司价值的提升。%  This paper analyzes the mechanism of donation behavior on agency efficiency .We find: donations can ease the cash flow for managers′egoistic utility expenditures , the higher agency efficiency and the less government interven-tion, the higher marketization process and agency efficiency; compared with higher degree of government intervention , donations improving agency efficiency more is in lower degree of government intervention .Compared with the growth and mature industry , recession industry does not improve agency efficiency with same donation behavior .Donation behavior is identified more easily by market in small firms and is seen as a social responsibility in big firms .Therefore , the donation expenditure helps alleviate agency costs of free cash flow , and improve agency efficiency of corporate; in reality, while lessening cash fow , donation improves also agency efficiency and reputation , benefiting the enhancement of the current or the future corporte value .

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