This paper, aiming at the practical process characteristics of the regulation of environmental pollution emission cap, builds a dynamic model of game between government and enterprises under the regulation of environmental pollution emission cap,studies the dynamic equilibrium relationship between government expected social costs and enterprises cutting pollution costs in different contexts,and reasonably explains why it is difficult to reduce enterprises pollution emissions effec⁃tively under the regulation of environmental pollution emission cap. The study proves that enterprises would make use of their information advantages to ease the cap whether the government adopts a soft or rigid cap for the implementation of regulation of environmental pollution emission cap,which can not reduce enterprises pollution emissions effectively.%文章针对环境污染排放限额制度这一环境规制措施的实践过程特点，构建了环境污染排放限额制度下的政府与企业动态博弈模型，研究分析不同情形下的政府期望社会成本与企业削减污染成本的动态平衡关系，给予实施环境污染排放限额制度为何难以有效降低企业污染排放合理解释。文章研究证明，政府无论是采取软性还是硬性限额方式实施环境污染排放限额制度，企业均可利用其信息优势争取到宽松的允许污染排放限额，并不能有效地降低企业污染排放。
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